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Modern legal systems provide two main mechanisms for 
protecting inventions: patents and trade secrets.1  Although the 
public is more familiar with patent law, the use of trade secret 
protection is on the rise.2  This observation is supported by 
empirical studies showing that manufacturers engaged in 
research and development in the U.S. do not regard the patent 
system as an effective way to protect inventions, whereas the 
system of trade secrets and the use of other means are perceived 
as being more efficient.3  Nevertheless, this does not mean that 
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University Faculty of Law. I wish to thank Dr. Amos Herman and my 
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Professor Gideon Parchomovsky for his invaluable contribution. 
 Dr. Chagai Vinizky is Assistant Professor, Sha’arei Mishpat College of Law, 
Hod Hasharon, Israel. 
 
1. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 50 (8th ed. 2011); 
Josh Lerner, Introduction to the Economics of Trade Secrets, HARV. BUS. SCH., 
http://www.people.hbs.edu/jlerner/TSintro.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2014). 
2.  Bruce T. Atkins, Note, Trading Secrets in the Information Age: Can 
Trade Secret Law Survive the Internet?, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 1151, 1152 (1996); 
Robert G. Bone, Exploring the Boundaries of Competitive Secrecy: An Essay on 
the Limits of Trade Secrets Law, in LAW, INFORMATION & INFORMATION TECH. 
99, 100 (Eli Lederman & Ron Shapira eds., 2001); Michael A. Epstein & Stuart 
D. Levi, Protecting Trade Secret Information: A Plan for Proactive Strategy, 43 
BUS. LAW. 887, 887 (1988); James W. Hill, Trade Secrets, Unjust Enrichment, 
and the Classification of Obligations, 4 VA. J. L. & TECH. 2, 2 (1999).  For 
extensive usage of this defense in the computer industry, see Gale R. Peterson, 
Trade Secrets in an Information Age, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 385, 386-87 (1995). 
3. Thus, for example, a study conducted in 1994 of 1,478 manufacturers 
engaged in research and development in the U.S. concluded that a patent was 
not considered an efficient way to protect inventions, as compared to trade 
secrets and lead time that were noted as the most efficient means. Moreover, 
1
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there is a clear preference for either one of the two methods. 
Most researchers in the field are of the opinion that these 
methods are complementary, i.e., in some cases it is better for 
inventors to choose the patent method, and in others the method 
of the trade secret law.  The choice often depends on the type of 
invention and the individual circumstances of the case.4  A 
survey of the legal and economic considerations that the 
inventor needs to weigh when deciding between the two methods 
 
the companies’ appraisal of the efficiency of trade secrets rose dramatically 
compared to the study conducted in 1983, to the point where this means 
became the leading one for the protection of inventions. Wesley M. Cohen, 
Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: 
Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (Or 
Not) 6, 9, 13, 24, 28, Figure 1-2 & Table 4-5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), available at 
www.nber.org/papers/w7552.v5.pdf.  For the study from 1983, see Richard C. 
Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and 
Development (Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper 862 (1988)), available at 
http://dido.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d08b/d0862.pdf.  Another study from 1995 of 95 
companies in the field of semiconductors concluded that there is a paradox in 
that on one hand there are grounds for the registration of patents in this 
industry but on the other hand the companies tend to rely more on trade 
secrets and other means rather than patents in order to realize a return on 
their investment in research and development. The paradox is explained, 
among others, in that the accumulation of patents serves as a type of 
bargaining chip in the negotiations for the rights to use the technologies of 
other companies, which is necessary for technological advancement in this 
industry. Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox 
Revisited: An Empirical Study of Patenting in the US Semiconductor Industry, 
1979-95, 32 J. ECON. 101, 102 (2001); see also Vincenzo Denicolo & Luigi 
Alberto Franzoni, Patents, Secrets, and the First-Inventor Defense, 13 J. ECON. 
& MGMT. STRATEGY 517, 517-18 (2004). 
4. WILLIAM  LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 359, 420 (2003); Cohen et al., supra note 3; 
Epstein & Levi, supra note 2, at 887-88; David D. Friedman, William M. 
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of Trade Secrets Law, 5 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 61, 62-64 (1991); Lerner, supra note 1; Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature 
and Function of the Patent System, 20 J. L. & ECON. 275 (1977); Edmund W. 
Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 683, 690 n.21 (1980).  However, there are those who believe that the 
protection afforded to trade secrets should be limited.  See Alan Hyde, The 
Wealth of Shared Information: Silicon Valley’s High-Velocity Labor Market, 
Endogenous Economic Growth, and the Law of Trade Secrets (Sept. 1998), 
http://andromeda.rutgers.edu/~hyde/WEALTH.htm.  As to the opinion which 
says that trade secrets law should be repealed in all but some exceptional 
cases, see Bone, supra note 2, at 121; Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade 
Secrets Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 241, 303-04 
& n.281 (1998). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/1
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is beyond the scope of this article. 
The present article considers four aspects in which the trade 
secret method is less efficient than the patents method: 
litigation costs, transaction costs, financing costs, and 
employment costs.  The main part of the article is devoted to the 
proposal of establishing a particular type of trade secrets 
registry, with the intention that it will reduce the above-
mentioned costs and will improve the efficiency of the trade 
secret method.  I propose a structure for the registration of trade 
secrets that is likely to solve most of the problems left unresolved 
by the escrow companies and the Indonesian legislation.  A trade 
secret registry may seem to be a contradiction in terms, because 
the purpose of a registry is to make public the information 
registered with it, whereas trade secrets must be kept 
confidential.  But the proposed registry integrates these two 
principles, so that a part of it remains confidential and another 
part is open to the public.  As part of the registry, trade secrets 
would be deposited confidentially through coded communication, 
including dating of the deposit.  But, the identity of the holders 
of the rights with respect to these secrets (including those 
possessing secondary rights, such as licensees and holders of a 
mortgage) and the identity of those bound by confidentiality 
regarding the secrets deposited (such as employees of the owner 
of the trade secret) will be public information.  The proposed 
registry would be handled by the registrar of trade secrets, a 
quasi-judicial figure empowered to resolve judicial disputes 
when necessary. 
 
II. The Costs of Litigating Claims of Patent Infringement and 
Trade Secret Misappropriation 
 
When an invention is protected by patent, the initial cost of 
litigating infringement suits should be lower than the cost of 
bringing a trade secrets appropriation suit.  Although a patent 
is vulnerable to direct and indirect attack,5 the starting point is 
 
5. Any person may request the nullification of a patent (direct attack) 
within nine months from the date of its registration, on the grounds that the 
invention was not suitable for registration as a patent from the outset.  See 35 
U.S.C. § 321 (2012).  Additionally, a common argument in defense of a claim of 
breach of patent is that the invention was not suitable for registration as a 
3
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that patent holders are entitled to the protection of their rights. 
Moreover, in the case of a patent, the scope of the protection 
must be defined clearly in the patent claims.  Therefore, there is 
no need to begin the proceedings with the question of the scope 
of the protected right. Moreover, because the patent owner has 
a monopoly on the use of her invention, there is no need to prove 
that the information has been taken from the patent owner. 
Because both self-discovery and reverse engineering are 
ineffective, it is sufficient for the patent owner to prove that the 
defendant is using the invention that is the subject of the patent 
without permission.  Nevertheless, when a defendant in an 
infringement suit challenges the validity of the patent, or argues 
that her actions did not breach the patent but rather 
“circumvented” it, the patent owner bears the cost refuting these 
arguments.  Although the burden of proof with respect to these 
arguments is on the defendant,6 the patent owner cannot risk 
having these arguments accepted, and therefore must refute 
them.  Consequently, overall costs of litigation in an action for 
patent infringement are likely to exceed the costs of litigation 
with respect to trade secrets. 
In the case of information protected by means of a trade 
secret, the initial costs of litigation in an action for 
misappropriation should be higher than those in an action for 
patent infringement.  In an action for misappropriation of a 
trade secret, one must prove, among other things, that: (a) the 
information meets all the requirement in the definition of a 
“trade secret,” including the plaintiff having taken reasonable 
security measures;7 (b) the plaintiff is the owner of the trade 
 
patent from the outset (indirect attack).  See id. § 282(b). 
6. Because the patent serves as prima facie evidence of its validity, the 
burden of proof that the invention is not suitable to be registered is imposed 
on the breaching defendant.  See id. § 282(a).  “The burden of establishing 
invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such 
invalidity.”  Id. 
7. Miguel Deutch, The Property Concept of Trade Secrets in Anglo-
American Law: An Ongoing Debate, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 313, 340-41 (1997).  
Professor Deutch explains that, unlike claims for breach of patent, in which 
the patent registry clearly identifies the boundaries of the protected 
information, there is no similar level of certainty with respect to the right to a 
trade secret, because the creation of the right to a trade secret lacks a formal 
foundation.  Id. at 341 & n.109.  See also Bone, supra note 4, at 278-79, 281; 
Hill, supra note 2, at 3.  The necessary components for recognition of a trade 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/1
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secret or at least has an exclusive license to it;8 and (c) the 
defendant committed the tort of trade secret misappropriation.9 
Furthermore, in an action for trade secret misappropriation, 
there are likely to be additional costs because of the need to 
refute the defense arguments, such as (a) that the defendant 
discovered the trade secret independently or as a result of 
reverse engineering;10 (b) that the use of the secret is protected 
 
secret are: (a) secrecy; (b) the information cannot be easily revealed legally; (c) 
the secret information provides an economic advantage; and (d) reasonable 
security measures were taken to protect the secret information.  See UNIFORM 
TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1979) [hereinafter UTSA].  The UTSA was a great 
success, as it was enacted by 47 states.  See Trade Secrets Act, THE NAT’L CONF. 
OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,   
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Trade%20Secrets%20Act (last 
visited May 19, 2015).  But the requirement to take security measures as an 
independent condition was not required according to the definition in the 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995). 
8. Unlike a patent, whose owner is registered in the patent registry, there 
is no certainty with respect to the identity of the owner of a trade secret. See 
Bone, supra note 4, at 278-79, 281; Hill, supra note 2, at 3.  In accordance with 
US law, the owner of an exclusive license can institute an action for 
misappropriation of a trade secret within the purview of the license, but 
afterwards is required to join the licensor. JERRY COHEN & ALAN S. GUTTERMAN, 
TRADE SECRETS PROTECTION AND EXPLOITATION 278 (1998). 
9. Unlike an action for breach of patent, with respect to the 
misappropriation of a trade secret it is necessary to prove that the defendant 
took the secret from the plaintiff through the tort of misappropriation of a trade 
secret.  See Bone, supra, note 4, at 278-79; Deutch, supra note 7; Hill, supra 
note 2, at 3. 
10. See Bone, supra note 4, at 278-79.  Independent discovery and reverse 
engineering are permitted actions pursuant to the trade secrets law.  Deutch, 
supra note 7, at 353-58.  “Proper means include: 1. Discovery by independent 
invention; 2. Discovery by reverse engineering.”  UTSA § 1 cmt.  Reverse 
engineering is defined in the Comment to UTSA § 1 as follows: “Discovery by 
reverse engineering, that is, by starting with the known product and working 
backward to find the method by which it was developed.” Id. See also Kewanee 
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974) (“A trade secret law, however, 
does not offer protection against discovery by fair and honest means, such as 
by independent invention. . . or by so-called reverse engineering.”); E.I. du Pont 
de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1015-16 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. 
denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971); Bone, supra note 2,  at 102, 107; RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 (1995) (“Independent discovery and 
analysis of publicly available products or information are not improper means 
of acquisition.”); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. a (1939); Thomas F. 
Cotter, Conflicting Interests in Trade Secrets, 48 FLA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1996); 
Hill, supra note 2, at 2-3 (“Two proper means of acquiring a trade secret are 
independent discovery and reverse engineering. Reverse engineering is the 
process of learning a trade secret by inspecting the product and figuring out 
how it works.”); Peterson, supra note 2, at 450-56. 
5
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under the defense of general professional skills or public policy,11 
or (c) that the defendant acquired the trade secret in good faith 
and for consideration.12 
Because actions for trade secrets misappropriation are 
complex and require lengthy litigation, some companies exploit 
the legal process to prevent former employees from working for 
a competitor or opening a competing company.  Such baseless 
actions create unnecessary litigation costs, frustrate efficient 
competition, and inhibit the mobility of employees, all of which 
affect the flow of information and economic development.13  A 
way of stretching out the litigation is to argue that the former 
employee knew many trade secrets, whereas, in reality, she was 
exposed only to some of them.  Even in cases in which the actions 
are not completely without merit, the duration of the litigation 
means that were the court to decide not to limit the occupation 
of the employee or to shorten the time of the limitation, the 
decision is usually irrelevant by the time it is rendered because 
the employee has already found other employment or the 
potential employer has found another employee.  In such cases, 
the former employer, who lost the action to limit the former 
employee’s occupation, has accomplished what he wanted. 
 
11. In accordance with the exception of the general professional skills, an 
employee is not liable for the misappropriation of a trade secret if the 
information that is the subject of the right to a trade secret has become part of 
his general professional skills. See AMP Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199, 
1205 (7th Cir. 1987); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Cont’l Aviation & Eng’g Corp., 
255 F. Supp. 645, 652-53 (E.D. Mich. 1966); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 42 cmt. d (1995); Bone, supra note 2, at 113.  The public policy 
exception enables the court to exempt defendants from liability in cases of 
trade secret misappropriation if the use of the secret is justified for reasons of 
public policy.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 cmt. c 
(1995). 
12. Even if a person acquired the stolen trade secret in good faith and for 
consideration, he is still liable to the owner of the secret, but the circumstances 
of the acquisition give the court discretion to exempt the defendant from 
remedies in various amounts. For example, the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 44(2)(d) (1995) imposes liability on the purchaser in 
good faith and for consideration as well, but permits taking the circumstances 
into consideration with respect to the remedies.  For an expanded treatment, 
see Deutch, supra note 7, at 345-51, 368-69. 
13. Bone, supra note 4, at 279; Kitch, Law and Economics, supra note 4, 
at 698-99. With respect to the societal interest in encouraging the mobility of 
employees, which contributes to the mobility of information that helps develops 
the economy, see Hyde, supra note 4,  at 1-4, 20, 28-30, 32, 34-36, 60. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/1
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The possibility of exploiting the need to prove many 
components in an action for a trade secret misappropriation is 
also likely to play into the hands of the defendant, who can 
initiate futile proceedings.  For example, a former employee can 
argue that the information that is alleged to be the trade secret 
of the company was not in its possession when he was employed 
there, or that it is information that was discovered by him or by 
others after he left the company.  Such an allegation is made on 
the assumption that the company will have difficulty proving 
how long it has possessed the information at issue.14 
Alternatively, the employee can argue that even if the 
information was in the possession of the company at the time he 
was employed there, there is no proof that he was indeed 
exposed to the relevant information or that he had access to it. 
A decision on such matters is likely to stretch out the litigation 
and, as a result, to increase its cost. 
 
III. Patents’ and Trade Secrets’ Transaction Costs 
 
Many people possess the skills required to create new 
information but lack the ability and the resources to turn the 
information into a finished product.  In other words, the creator 
of the information, for various reasons, is often unable to 
maximize the value of the information he has created.  
Therefore, both the creator of the information and society have 
an interest in transferring the information from the creator to 
someone who can turn it into a product.15  A typical case is one 
in which a person created information that brought about an 
improvement in equipment produced by a certain company.16  In 
most cases, the creator of the information cannot independently 
 
14. With respect to this problem, see the website of EscrowTech 
International Inc., which provides escrow "IP audit trail services." IP Audit 
Trail Services, ESCROWTECH INT’L INC., 
www.escrowtech.com/ip_audit_trail.php (last visited Jan. 1, 2015).  For the 
difficulty caused in the absence of a formal dimension for the scope of protected 
information, see Deutch, supra note 7, at 341. 
15. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources 
for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC 
AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 614-15 (Universities-National Bureau ed., 1962); 
POSNER, supra note 1, at 15-20, 22-23, 53-55. 
16. Kitch, The Nature and Function, supra note 4, at 277-78. 
7
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make use of the information in her possession.  It would be 
inefficient for her to establish a factory to produce that 
instrument merely in order to implement the improvement she 
devised, and she often does not have the means to do so.  The 
entity that can maximize the value of the information is the 
company that is already producing the equipment.  The public 
and the creator of the information have an interest in having the 
information transferred to the company that can use it in the 
most efficient manner.17 
The question is: what is the most efficient mechanism for 
transferring the information from its creator to the company? 
When comparing the patent option to that of trade secrets, it 
becomes apparent that the patent option deals well with most of 
the risks in a transaction involving information.  With a patent, 
there is no problem in presenting the invention in the course of 
negotiations to a potential purchaser or licensee.  The patent 
creates a defined set of legal rights that is known to both parties 
at the outset of the negotiations.  Patents are disclosed in the 
patent registry and grant their owners the exclusive right to use 
them.  Therefore, there are no difficulties in presenting the 
invention in the course of negotiations for the sale of the patent 
or the granting of a license.  Even if the negotiations fail, the 
company to which the offer was made cannot make use of the 
patent-protected invention.  Following the sale of the patent and 
its transfer to the purchaser at the patent registry, there is no 
concern that the previous owner of the patent will “sell” it again, 
because according to the patent registry, she is no longer the 
owner of the patent. Nor is there concern that after a patent 
owner gave an exclusive license to use the patent, which was 
registered in the patent registry, she will grant additional 
licenses. The potential licensee can check in the patent registry 
and ascertain that an exclusive license has already been 
granted. Moreover, there is no fear that the licensee would 
falsely represent herself as the owner of the patent or try to “sell” 
it, because her rights are disclosed in the patent registry. The 
registration in the patent registry leaves no doubt as to who the 
owner of the patent is and who the exclusive licensee is.  A 
registered patent also enables the efficient creation of 
 
17. See Arrow, supra note 15. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/1
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partnerships in the information protected by the patent, when 
the patent owner is interested in entering into contracts with 
companies that possess complementary information or 
resources.18  The patent owner may sell an unspecified portion 
of the patent to his new partners, and they will also be registered 
in the patent registry.19  These advantages, together with some 
others, have led to the development of a phenomenon known as 
“patent commercialization.” 
Conversely, when we examine the ability to carry out 
transactions of transfers, licensing of, or partnership in trade 
secrets, the costs of the transaction are significantly higher than 
the costs of a similar transaction in patents.  When the owner of 
a trade secret wishes to present it for the purpose of selling it or 
granting a license for its use, she encounters difficulties in 
exposing the secret in the course of the negotiations.  On the one 
hand, the owner cannot agree to present the secret until the 
offeree obligates himself by means of a non-disclosure agreement 
(NDA) not to use the secret and not to pass it on to a third party 
if the negotiations fail.  If the secret is disclosed to a potential 
buyer in the absence of such a commitment, the latter can 
erroneously believe that he may use the secret even without the 
consent of the owner.  The buyer can then offer a low purchase 
price, or else not make any offer to purchase the information, 
and use the information as he sees fit.  On the other hand, there 
may be a case when the potential buyer agrees to sign the non-
disclosure agreement, but finds out that the information is 
already known to him, which now he will have to prove.  This 
problem is known as Arrow’s disclosure paradox.  This situation 
frequently occurs when a person develops an improvement of an 
existing product and tries to sell the idea to a company that 
manufactures the product.  Given that the idea is intended to 
improve its product, the company will be concerned that it may 
have already arrived at the idea by itself.  If it makes a 
commitment not to use the information revealed to it in the 
course of the negotiations, it will have to prove that the 
 
18. See Kitch, The Nature and Function, supra note 4, at 277-78, 290 
(arguing that the patent method decreases transaction costs for the creator of 
the information who is interested in transacting with other companies that 
have complementary information or resources). 
19. For the authority of each partner, see 35 U.S.C. § 262. 
9
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information was indeed in its possession before entering into 
negotiations.   
There is also a concern that if the negotiations do not 
succeed because of the high consideration requested by the 
offeror, and the information offered to the company is not known 
to it, the company will not be able to use the information in the 
future, even if it is able to arrive at the information on its own 
at a lower cost, through self-discovery or reverse engineering. 
These concerns may lead the company to refuse to sign an 
NDA.20  When the offeree is in possession of the information 
before the start of the negotiations, substantive law enables him 
to continue to use the information.  The burden of proof with 
respect to this allegation, however, may be imposed on the 
offeree.  Shifting the burden of proof is not a negligible detail; 
the burden of proving that the defendant lawfully acquired the 
information is not easily met and involves high litigation costs.21 
Under certain circumstances, the burden on the offeree to prove 
that the information was already in his possession before the 
negotiations may increase the reluctance of the offeree 
companies to sign an NDA, especially if there is a risk that their 
position will not be accepted.  
Moreover, companies that engage in negotiations with 
creators of information take the risk of being sued for stealing a 
trade secret from an outside entity, which can lead to high 
litigation costs and harm the company’s reputation.22  Indeed, as 
was demonstrated in an important study, the concern shown by 
companies is so great that they not only refuse to sign NDAs but 
often refuse entirely to enter into negotiations to acquire a trade 
secret or do so infrequently. When companies are prepared to 
enter into negotiations despite these concerns, they demand that 
the owner of the trade secret sign a waiver before he discloses 
the secret information. Generally, by signing such a form, the 
 
20. Arrow, supra note 15, at 614-16; Bone, supra note 4, at 280 n.174; 
Steven N. S. Cheung, Property Rights in Trade Secrets, 20 ECON. INQUIRY 40, 
44-45 (1982); see also Bone, supra note 2, at 127; Kitch, The Nature and 
Function, supra note 4, at 277-78. 
21. See Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l v. Holder Found. Seeds, 35 F.3d 1226, 1240 
(8th Cir. 1994); Sokol Crystal Prods. v. DSC Commc’ns Corp., 15 F.3d 1427, 
1432 (7th Cir. 1994); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 41 cmt. 
b (1995); Bone, supra note 4, at 279 nn.169, 170. 
22. Cheung, supra note 20, at 46. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/1
  
2014 TRADE SECRETS REGISTRY 465 
offeror admits that there are no confidential relations between 
himself and the offeree, and that he can rely for protection of his 
rights only on rights created pursuant to patent or copyright 
law.23  Other companies demand that before the negotiations the 
offeror consents to provide the information for a very small sum 
of money.24  The attitude is different when the offeror already 
has a patent on the information offered.25 
There is another risk that concerns offeree companies, even 
when they agree to sign a confidentiality agreement (e.g., in 
cases in which there is no concern that the information to be 
presented to them was previously known to them).  The 
additional risk stems from the fact that the commitment does 
not detail the information that is to be disclosed in the course of 
the negotiations.26  In the absence of such detail, there is a risk 
that, after a period of time, the offeror may assert that he had 
revealed additional information to the offeree company in the 
course of the negotiations (which, in actual fact, never 
happened), thus preventing the company from making use of it.27 
A further risk is present for the owner of the trade secret, even 
if the company is prepared to sign a confidentiality agreement 
 
23. Id. at 45; Kitch, The Nature and Function, supra note 4, at 277-78.  
For an expanded discussion of this topic and examples of typical release forms, 
see ARTHUR H. SEIDEL & RONALD L. PANITCH, WHAT THE GENERAL 
PRACTITIONER SHOULD KNOW ABOUT TRADE SECRETS AND EMPLOYMENT 
AGREEMENTS (1973), as quoted in Cheung, supra note 20.  The above 
conclusions were reached based on a study of 105 contracts for the 
transmission of an idea.  Eighty seven of these contracts conditioned the receipt 
and/or the examination of the idea on its not forcing relations of 
“confidentiality.”  Seventy five of the contracts were conditioned on the offeror 
waiving all rights to the idea other than those acquired by a present or future 
patent.  Fifty seven contracts stipulated that the examination of the idea would 
not force any commitment of any kind on the accepting company.  In practice, 
every one of the 105 contracts contained one or more of these stipulations.  Del 
I. Hawkins & Gerald G. Udell, Corporate Caution and Unsolicited New Product 
Ideas: A Survey of Corporate Waiver Requirements, 58 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 375, 
381-82 (1976).  These findings were for the most part consistent with Cheung’s 
findings in a study that included 320 contracts for the transmission of an idea.  
Cheung, supra note 20, at 46 n.20. 
24. Kitch, The Nature and Function, supra note 4, at 277-78. 
25. Cheung, supra note 20, at 45. 
26. Detailing the secret as part of the commitment could result in the 
offeree reading the commitment, becoming informed of the secret, then 
refusing to sign. 
27. See IP Audit Trail Services, supra note 14. 
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regarding the information that is to be disclosed in the course of 
the negotiations.  The owner has no proof that he is in fact the 
owner of the confidential information disclosed during the 
negotiations.  In the absence of such proof, the company can 
argue that the information disclosed to it did not belong to the 
offeror, but rather to another entity.28 
The risks to the parties that arise during negotiations for 
the sale of a trade secret result in the failure of efficient 
transactions at the initial stages.  This result is particularly 
harmful when the owner of the information cannot make 
efficient use of the information he created unless he contracts 
with a company operating in that field.29  Efficiency is achieved 
when the information is to be used by an entity that appraises it 
at its highest value.  The highest economic value of the 
information is the highest amount that someone is prepared to 
pay for it.  One is prepared to pay the highest price for the 
information if he thinks that he can derive the highest benefit 
from it, measured by the price that consumers are willing to pay 
for the product based on the information.  Therefore, if the 
information is in the hands of someone willing and able to pay 
the highest amount for it, it will be possible to arrive at an 
efficient result.30  In the absence of a solution that can decrease 
the risks leading to the failure of efficient transactions in which 
the owner of the information transfers it to an entity that can 
derive the maximum benefit from it, the result is market 
malfunction, caused by, among others, an information failure.31 
Resources flow to profitable opportunities unless obstacles 
prevent their free flow.  One of the obstacles can be the high cost 
of information.32  These information costs, which are part of the 
transaction costs, cause negotiations to fail before they even 
begin, and potentially efficient transactions do not take place.33 
If there is a resource that remains unused because of the 
inability of the owner to maximize its value, and who prevents 
 
28. Id. 
29. See Arrow, supra note 15, at 615. 
30. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 12-14, 18-19. For a definition of efficiency 
according to the Kaldor-Hicks theory or maximizing wealth, see id. at 17-18. 
31. Arrow, supra note 15, at 615-16. 
32. POSNER, supra note 1, at 15. 
33. Bone, supra note 2, at 127. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/1
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others from making profitable use of it by not transferring the 
information to them, an opportunity cost is created. An 
opportunity cost is the best price that others can command for 
that resource.34  Using collaterals to reduce the risks detailed 
above would also increase transaction costs.35 
Additional stumbling blocks to carrying out transactions 
with respect to trade secrets stem from the absence of public 
knowledge regarding the identity of the owners of trade secrets. 
The nature of the information that is the subject of the trade 
secret is an asset that remains known to the seller even after the 
transfer of ownership, creates the risk that the former owner of 
the trade secret and his employees may continue to use the trade 
secret, including disclosing it to third parties.36  Similarly, there 
is a potential for future deceptive transactions in which the 
previous owner may continue “to sell” the information to 
additional entities after having already sold the secret (so that 
at the time of the additional sale, he is no longer the owner).37 
The previous owner can easily defraud the offeree because of the 
secrecy surrounding the identity of the present owner of the 
trade secret.  This potential for deceit creates many risks for the 
real owner of the secret.  The imposition of responsibility on the 
third party – the last purchaser – for the use of a trade secret is 
complex and results in high investigation and litigation costs. 
Moreover, there is the risk of creating a chain of disclosures that 
can place the information in the public domain, so that the right 
to it expires altogether.38  Even if it is possible to inform 
 
34. For the concept of opportunity costs, see POSNER, supra note 1, at 6-9. 
35. The costs caused by the need to use collateral increase transaction 
costs. See Bone, supra note 4, at 280. 
36. 1 R.M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 2.02(1)(2) pp. 2-43 – 2-
44.5 (2013).  Regarding the possibility that the transferee can obtain an 
injunction that would prohibit a former employee of the transferor from using 
a trade secret that has been sold, see Hecht Foods v. Sherman, 351 N.Y.S.2d 
711 (App. Div. 1974).  Regarding the duties of the seller and his employees and 
his agents after the sale not to continue to use the secret or to disclose it to 
others, see Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp. v. United States, 591 F.2d 652 (Ct. 
Cl. 1979); Tode v. Gross, 28 N.E. 469 (N.Y. 1891).  Similarly, an inventor who 
has transferred an invention that is not yet patented will be stopped from 
requesting a patent with the objective of infringing upon the rights of the 
transferee.  New Era Elec. Range Co. v. Serrell, 169 N.E. 105 (N.Y. 1929). 
37. Stewart v. Hook, 45 S.E. 369 (Ga. 1903); MILGRIM, supra note 36; 
Cheung, supra note 20, at 44-45. 
38. Cheung, supra note 20, at 44-45; Bone, supra note 4, at 280, n.175. 
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subsequent purchasers of the rights of previous purchasers, 
subsequent purchasers are not required to pay damages for the 
period of use of the trade secret until they knew, or should have 
known, that prior rights existed.39  Moreover, if the later 
purchasers acquired the trade secret in good faith and for 
monetary consideration, they will indeed be liable to the 
previous purchasers.  The circumstances of the purchase, 
however, grant discretion to the court to exempt them from 
compensation in various amounts.40 
The risk of deceit applies not only to future transactions, but 
to past ones as well. When it transpires that there were 
purchasers prior to the present ones, the present purchasers will 
be prevented from using the secret once they know or should 
have known about the right of the earlier owners.41  Even if the 
purchase of the trade secret was in good faith and for 
consideration, the present purchasers are still liable vis-à-vis 
the earlier ones, although, here too, the circumstances of the 
 
39. The law in the US imposes liability on a third party not only in cases 
in which he knew that he was using a stolen trade secret but also in cases in 
which he should have known. Regarding the extent of the protection in the US, 
see UTSA § 1(2)(i), (ii)(B)(I), (III); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 40(b)(3); H.H. PERRITT, TRADE SECRETS: A PRACTITIONER’S 
GUIDE 111 n.14 (1994); Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. McCain Foods Ltd., 941 F.2d 970, 
972-73 (9th Cir. 1991); Wright v. Palmer, 464 P.2d 363, 366 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1970); Deutch, supra note 7, at 344, 353, 360.  According to English and 
Australian law, the protection with respect to third parties is based on the laws 
of fiduciary duty. A third party that has received a secret when he knew or 
should have known of the breach of trust, will be considered to be liable himself 
vis-à-vis the owner of the secret. Even in cases in which the third party did not 
know and there was no reason he should have known of the breach of trust at 
the time of receipt of the trade secret, he is subject to the droit de suite of the 
owner, if he did not change his situation to his detriment while still acting in 
good faith. A third party who did not know and was not expected to know at 
the time of receipt of the trade secret about the breach, and changed his 
situation to his detriment as a result, is liable to the owner of the information 
as a matter of discretion, according to the circumstances, including the extent 
of the losses caused to each party and other justified considerations. Therefore, 
the absolute fact that the defendant is a purchaser in good faith is not 
necessarily sufficient to exempt him from liability.  See Deutch, supra note 7, 
at 351. In this regard, see also Ansell Rubber Co. Pty., Ltd. v. Allied Rubber 
Industries Pty., Ltd. [1967] V.R. 37; Schering Chem. Ltd. v. Falkman, Ltd. 2 
W.L.R. 848 (1981); A. COLEMAN, THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS 49 
(1992); ROBERT DEAN, THE LAW OF TRADE SECRETS 258-72 (1990). 
40. See supra note 12. Regarding English and Australian law, see also 
supra note 39. 
41. See supra note 39. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/1
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purchase grant discretion to the court to exempt the present 
purchasers from remedies in various amounts.42 
Fraudulent transactions create litigation costs, and the risk 
of fraud and uncertainty creates additional transaction costs. 
For example, potential purchasers may ask the seller for 
collateral to ensure that the trade secret rights received were not 
already sold to a previous purchaser, in the event that it may be 
possible for the seller or his employees to make use of the trade 
secret after the sale, or in case the seller resells the trade secret 
to future purchasers after the sale.43 
The difficulty in conducting trade secret transactions is 
present also with respect to the granting of a license to use the 
trade secret. In the absence of public notice regarding the 
existence of an exclusive license for the use of a trade secret, and 
regarding the identity of the owner of the exclusive license, the 
trade secret owner can grant additional licenses that will breach 
the right to the exclusive license.  Given the existing law, if the 
recipients of the additional licenses receive the secret with the 
consent of its owner, the owner of the exclusive license has the 
right to sue only the owner of the secret on grounds of breach of 
contract.44 
Another risk to which the trade secret owner is exposed is 
that the licensee may reveal the secret to third parties. As 
already noted, this leads to high investigation and litigation 
 
42. See supra note 12. Regarding English and Australian law, see also 
supra note 39. 
43. Regarding the need to demand collateral in the case of an offer to 
acquire a trade secret, owing to the concern that the seller is not the owner of 
the trade secret, see Deutch, supra note 7, at 364. Failure to receive collateral 
transfers the risk to the purchaser. Id. 
44. UTSA § 1(2) (ii) (B) (II) includes in the definition of “misappropriation” 
of a trade secret, “disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express 
or implied consent by a person who. . . (B) at the time of disclosure or use knew 
or had reason to know that his knowledge of the trade secret was. . . (II) 
acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or 
limit its use. . . .” But the use of a trade secret by the other owners of the 
licenses is not considered to be contrary to the consent of the owner of the trade 
secret and is not in contravention of their duty to the owner of the secret, 
therefore they have not committed the tort of misappropriation of a trade 
secret. The owner of the additional license uses the secret in accordance with 
his contract with the owner of the secret, and has no duty not to use the secret 
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costs intended to impose liability on the latter. In any case the 
third party will be exempt from liability for the use of the trade 
secrets up to the point at which he knows or should have known 
that the secrets were stolen from their owners. A more serious 
risk is disclosure of the secret by a licensee in order to bring 
about the expiration of the right.45  Moreover, in the absence of 
public notice regarding the identity of the exclusive licensee, the 
licensee is likely to represent himself as the owner of the secret 
and to sell the right to third parties who buy it in good faith and 
for consideration. The purchasers will naturally be liable to the 
owner of the secret, but the circumstances of the purchase grant 
discretion to the court to exempt the purchasers from remedies 
to various degrees.46  These risks lead the owner of the trade 
secret to demand collateral from the owner of the license to 
insure the confidentiality of the information, which in turn 
increases transaction costs.47 
 
IV. Financing Costs: Patents and Trade Secrets as Guarantees 
for an Investment 
 
The patent system is efficient in sales and licensing 
transactions and in the creation of partnerships, and it enables 
the creation of mortgaging transactions. An integral part of the 
process of the development of information is the receipt of 
outside funding from investors who believe in the economic 
value of the information being developed.48  To receive financing, 
the creator of the information must disclose the developed 
information to investors, with the level of detail depending on 
their demands.  If the investors are persuaded by the economic 
potential of the idea, they will be willing to invest on the 
 
45. Perritt, supra note 39, at 110-11 n.114; Cheung supra note 20, at 44-
45. 
46. See supra note 12. Regarding English and Australian law, see also 
supra note 39. 
47. Cheung, supra note 20, at 44-45; Bone, supra note 4, at 280 n.175. As 
part of the study he conducted of 150 contracts for licenses for the use of 
information, Cheung indeed found that the demand for collateral characterizes 
contracts for the granting of a license to a trade secret. Id. 
48. Kitch, The Nature and Function, supra note 4, at 277-78; Raymond T. 
Nimmer & Patricia A. Krauthaus, Secured Financing and Information 
Property Rights, 2 HIGH TECH. L. J. 195, 197 (1987). 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/1
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condition that they receive the appropriate collateral.  If the 
collateral is an asset that is not connected to the developed 
information, such as real estate, there is no difficulty in securing 
the financing.  But if the developers of the information have no 
assets other than the rights to that information, the only way to 
provide collateral to investors is to mortgage the rights to the 
information.  The amorphous character of the rights to the 
information can create many difficulties when offering it as an 
asset for purposes of collateral, because of the inherent risks 
described below, thus justifying the exercise of a great deal of 
caution in accepting such collateral.  A mechanism is needed, 
therefore, to lower the risks of using the rights to the 
information as collateral and to keep the transaction costs down, 
thereby avoiding an increase in the interest rate charged for the 
loan.49 
Both the lender and the borrower have the incentive to 
create collateral out of the rights to information.  After 
decreasing the risk level, the receipt of collateral in the form of 
rights to the information can be of great value to the lender.50 
The ability to offer the right to the information as collateral is 
even more important to the borrower.  Naturally, the creator of 
the information also has the option to sell an unspecified part of 
the ownership rights of the information against receipt of 
financing.  This is the most common option at present, but it is 
not a desirable alternative for the borrower. In most cases, after 
the sale of an unspecified portion of the ownership rights for the 
purposes of financing, the creator of the information remains the 
owner of a small, unspecified portion of the idea that she created, 
usually as the owner of a relatively small percentage of the 
overall shares in the company that is to develop the idea.  This 
result is unnecessary.  If the creator of the information believes 
in the potential of the idea she created, she will prefer to receive 
a loan, put up the information as collateral, and return the 
amount borrowed, instead of selling an non-specific substantial 
portion of the right of ownership, the future value of which is 
likely to be exponentially higher than the amount she will have 
received for it in order to secure the financing. 
 
49. Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 48, at 195. 
50. Robert S. Bramson, Intellectual Property as Collateral – Patents, 
Trade Secrets, Trademarks and Copyrights, 36 BUS. LAW 1567, 1598 (1981). 
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When examining which of the two mechanisms for the 
protection of an invention – patent or trade secret – is more 
appropriate for purposes of commercial financing, there is no 
doubt that patent law is preferable.  It is straightforward to 
mortgage patent by registering the mortgage in the patent 
registry.51  The possibility of registering a mortgage on a patent 
solves many of the problems involved in the mortgaging of 
information.  The creator of the information has no difficulty 
presenting the patent-protected information to the financier for 
the purpose of evaluating the information as an asset 
appropriate to serve as collateral.  The obligation of the financier 
not to use the information is completely unnecessary.  The 
information protected by a patent is already disclosed to the 
public in the patent registry, and the owner of the patent has the 
exclusive right to use the invention.  To the extent that the 
financier reaches the conclusion that the patent is appropriate 
to serve as collateral, he can accept it as such.  The mortgaged 
asset is the registered patent, and therefore the financier has no 
difficulty proving the scope of the mortgaged information.  If the 
owner of the patent has many patents and is interested in 
mortgaging only a particular one, there is no difficulty in 
creating a mortgage only for that patent, leaving the remaining 
patents unencumbered.  The mortgage continues to be 
registered as a property right even if the ownership rights to the 
patent are transferred to a new owner. 
The patent system also assists in protecting the value of the 
collateral, which is determined by several multi-factored 
parameters: the existence of the mortgaged asset, the borrower’s 
proof of ownership of the asset, and the absence of a breach of 
third parties’ rights. When the collateral is a patent, the 
financier can find proof in the patent registry that the invention 
has been registered as a patent and that the borrower is the 
registered owner, and he (the lender) can rely on this 
 
51. If there it is desired that the mortgage on the patent be valid with 
respect to third parties, it must be registered both in the patent registry and 
in the registry where mortgages are registered. U.C.C. art. 9. See David 
Einhorn, U.S.A. Report Q190: Contracts Regarding Intellectual Property 
Rights (Assignments and Licenses) and Third Parties, at 7-8, available at 
https://www.aippi.org/download/commitees/190/GR190usa.pdf (last visited 
May 19, 2015). 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/1
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registration.52  A cautious financier, however, should not make 
do with the patent registration and the registration of the 
borrower as the owner of the patent. Rather, he should check 
whether the invention was qualified to be registered as a patent 
and whether the borrower was indeed entitled to be registered 
as the owner of the patent.  Otherwise, there is a risk that the 
patent will be nullified.  It is also necessary to examine whether 
the invention breaches any third party preferred rights, because 
it is possible that the patent infringes on a previous patent.53 
The second parameter is the ability of the owner of the 
mortgaged asset to protect his property: if the mortgaging of a 
patent is at issue, the ability of the patent owner to protect its 
value is particularly high because the registered patent creates 
an exclusive right to the use of the patented invention.  The 
third, and the final parameter, is ability of the owner of the 
guarantee to realize the collateral. 
As noted above, a substantive part of any development 
 
52. The patent registry is a registry of rights, in other words, before the 
registration of the patent an examination is carried out by the registrar of 
patents concerning the validity of the patent and the identity of its owners. 
The registry encourages the registration of transfers of ownership through 35 
U.S.C. § 261 [hereinafter section 261], which provides that the transfer of a 
patent is void vis-à-vis any purchaser or mortgagee who acted in good faith and 
for consideration, unless the transfer was registered in the patent registry 
within three months from the date of the transfer, or before the date of the last 
acquisition or mortgage. See Einhorn, supra note 51, at 2. Therefore, it is 
possible to check easily, quickly, and at minimal expense that a patent exists 
for the invention in the patent registry, and to check the identity of the 
currently registered owner of the patent. Bramson, supra note 50, at 1574-75. 
53. With respect to the existing risk of voiding a patent, see supra note 5 
and accompanying text. See also Bramson, supra note 50, at 1575-1577, n.38. 
The existence of a patent in the name of the borrower does not preclude the 
possibility that a previous patent exists, which was breached by the borrower’s 
patent. This occurs in situations in which the rule known as “blocking patent” 
is applicable. According to this rule, a person who made a significant 
improvement in a patented invention can receive a patent on the improvement 
(although the latter must still receive a license from the owner of the previous 
patent to use the improvement). The result is that neither the owner of the 
original patent nor the one who improved upon it can use the improvement 
unless they arrive at an agreement. But the “reverse doctrine of equivalents,” 
which is used only infrequently, releases the one improving upon the patent 
from liability for breach of patent if the improvement contains radical progress. 
Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 
75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1007-13 (1997). See also Bone, supra note 2, at 104, n.19. 
For practical suggestions regarding preliminary examinations for the 
prevention of such concerns, see Bramson, supra note 50. 
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process involves securing outside funding from investors who 
believe in the potential value of the information being developed. 
To receive financing, the creator of the information must 
persuade the potential investors of the quality of the developed 
information, revealing as much detail as required by the 
investor.  Some investors are satisfied with the presentation of 
a more general idea.  But there are those who insist on 
examining the detailed information before deciding whether to 
invest in developing the information.  They also want to make 
sure that there is a formula, as promised, behind the general 
definition, and that the confidential information meets the 
criteria of a trade secret.  The disclosure of a secret to investors 
creates the same problem that arises when disclosing a secret in 
the initial stages of negotiations for its transfer.  The owner of 
the trade secret who wishes to present the secret to a 
professional financier also faces the problem that the financier 
refuses to sign a confidentiality agreement before the secret is 
disclosed to him.  Professional financiers, especially those who 
deal with the financing of high-tech companies, are regularly 
exposed to financing requests from entities possessing 
confidential information, at times competing companies that 
deal in the development of information in the same field.  The 
advance signing of multiple confidentiality agreements exposes 
the financiers to substantial litigation and limits their ability to 
invest in broad market segments.  At the same time, the owner 
of the secret may hesitate to disclose the secret lest the financier 
mistakenly think that he can take the secret and disclose it to 
another company in which he is interested in investing.54 
The exposure of the secret is not the only problem when 
accepting a trade secret as collateral for a loan. In the absence 
of proof of what the mortgaged trade secret is, and should the 
loan go unpaid, the professional financier may be left with the 
borrowing company, while the employees and founders will have 
disappeared with the trade secrets.  Moreover, the company’s 
founders and employees may argue that the trade secrets in 
their possession were developed after they left the company, and 
 
54. See Lyne Sharpe Paine, Trade Secrets and the Justification of 
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that, therefore, the collateral is not applicable to them.55  In 
practice, this concern can be resolved if the owner of the trade 
secret agreed to deposit the secret with the professional 
financier.  The owner, however, is likely to refuse because the 
financier might not take the necessary security measures and 
his right will therefore expire.  Moreover, even if the trade secret 
owner were to be willing to leave a copy of the original trade 
secret in the possession of the financier, this would not 
constitute a solution for cases in which the financiers want the 
collateral to apply to the trade secret that is subject to ongoing 
development.  In these cases, it is not reasonable to expect the 
owner of the trade secret to deposit with the investors, on an on-
going basis, the latest development of the trade secret. 
Another problem exists if the owner has more than one 
trade secret. In this case, it is difficult to distinguish between 
the owner’s various trade secrets if he is interested in 
mortgaging only one of them.  If the mortgage agreement 
between the owner of the secrets and the financier includes only 
general definitions, it will be difficult later to distinguish 
between the various secrets that may exist in a similar field. 
Moreover, to enable the mortgaging of trade secrets, it is also 
necessary to create a system that permits the registration of 
these mortgages, so that it is possible to warn third parties and 
give the financier the status of a secured creditor. The mortgage 
registration systems in their present form are not appropriate 
for mortgaging trade secrets that cannot, for example, be listed 
in the registry of trade secret mortgages, which is open for public 
viewing. 
Because of the many difficulties involved in the mortgaging 
of trade secrets in accordance with existing law, there are few 
instances in which companies mortgage trade secrets, despite 
the advantages of doing so, as described above.56  Therefore, 
 
55. See IP Audit Trail Services, supra note 14; IP Collateral and 
Investment Protection Service, ESCROWTECH INT’L INC., 
www.escrowtech.com/ip_protection.php (last visited Jan 30, 2015). 
56. See, for example, a relatively rare case that dealt with mortgaging a 
trade secret: State Bank of Annawan v. Rendispos Corp., 173 U.S.P.Q. 136 
(S.D. Ill. 1971). The State Bank of Annawan received several mortgages on 
patents and trade secrets of the Pace Corporation as security for a loan. 
Because of several business moves by Rendispos Corporation, using the 
protected information of Pace Corporation, the latter were edged out of the 
21
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accommodations must be made between commercial financing 
laws and trade secret laws to appropriately address these 
problems and reduce the cost of financing.57 
 
V. Employment Costs: Making Employees Privy to an 
Invention Protected by a Patent or to Information Protected as 
a Trade Secret 
 
If the owner of confidential information wishes to use it for 
the purpose of developing products, he has no alternative but to 
share that information with his employees.  If the confidential 
information is not legally protected, these employees can steal it 
from the owner and transfer it to his competitors.  Legal 
protection of the confidential information is likely to reduce this 
risk.  In this regard, there is a substantive difference between 
patent protection and trade secret protection.  The owner of a 
factory with a patent registered in his name that gives him a 
monopoly on the protected information is not concerned about 
revealing the protected information, which in any case is 
disclosed to the public in the patent registry, to employees.  At 
the same time, the trade secret owner must trust his employees 
not to transfer the trade secret to his competitors.  Having them 
sign a commitment not to use or disclose the trade secret is not 
always effective.  The absence of public disclosure of the identity 
of those subject to the right to a trade secret can cause several 
difficulties.  For example, when an employee is interested in 
moving to a new place of employment, the new employer may 
not be aware of the fact that the person, whom she is interested 
in hiring, is in the possession of trade secrets belonging to his 
previous employer.  Current trade secrets law does not enable 
the owner of the trade secret to seek damages from the 
competitor (the new employer) for making use of the owner’s 
trade secrets (that the new employer received from the new 
employee) until she became aware, or should have become aware 
 
market and declared insolvent. The patents and trade secrets of Pace were 
transferred to the bank, which filed an action against Rendispos Corporation 
for breach of patent and unauthorized appropriation of trade secrets. The bank 
prevailed in the action and received funds that enabled repayment of the loan. 
57. See Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 48, at 195-200, 204, 224, & 226. 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/1
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of the fact that these were stolen trade secrets.58  Moreover, in 
the absence of public notice of the former employee being subject 
to the right of the trade secret owner, the former employee can 
easily sell the trade secret to a buyer in good faith and for 
consideration, while representing himself as the owner of the 
secret. In such a case, the buyer will be liable to the owner of the 
trade secret, but the circumstances of the purchase grant 
discretion to the court to exempt him from remedies in various 
amounts.59  Such risks can cause concerns for the owner of a 
trade secret about revealing them to employees. To avoid such 
risk, she may prefer to choose the inefficient alternative of 
employing people with whom she has personal or family ties and 
on whom she can rely, but who are not necessarily the best 
people for the job.  The concern about employee involvement can 
also cause the trade secret owner to organize his business in an 
inefficient manner, e.g., dividing assignments among a large 
number of employees so that each of them knows less, or 
reducing the research and development division to a small and 
inefficient number of employees.60  The fear of involving 
additional entities can cause the owner of the secret to sacrifice 
efficiency by making do without a part of his work force. The 
demand for collateral from employees to ensure their fulfillment 
of the confidentiality commitment increases the costs of 
employment. 
The risk in employing workers affects not only the current 
employer, who is concerned that these entities may leak his 
trade secrets.  It also affects the willingness of other companies 
to purchase the business of the previous employer.  For example, 
company A, which has a large number of confidentiality 
agreements with employees regarding trade secrets, now 
proposes to merge with company B through a sale, so that 
 
58. See supra note 39. 
59. See supra note 12. 
60. These phenomena were mentioned in cases in which the law does not 
recognize the right to a trade secret or when such a right is not enforced. See 
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 485-86 (1974); Bone, supra note 
4, at 272-73 n.143; Friedman, Landes & Posner, supra note 4, at 67; Sharp 
Paine, supra note 54, at 253-56. But these phenomena also occur in cases in 
which trade secret laws are enforced, but they are not efficient enough and 
many risks remain for the owner of the trade secret, in the absence of a public 
record of the identity of those subject to his rights, as stated above. 
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company A ceases to exist.  Company B is concerned that former 
employees of company A, who moved to a new company, can 
claim that because company A no longer exists, there is no issue 
of possessing trade secrets of their former employer.  Company 
A, however, had assigned all employee confidentiality 
agreements to company B.  In these cases, new employers, who 
would like to hire former employees of company A, find it 
difficult to ascertain whether their potential employees have a 
confidentiality obligation toward other companies.  They may 
consider the use that they can make of the trade secrets, until 
such time that they become aware of the stolen rights, as use in 
good faith. Company B will then be entitled to damages only 
from the point when the new employers became aware or should 
have become aware that these were stolen secrets.61  Moreover, 
if the new employers purchase the trade secrets in good faith and 
for consideration, they are liable to company B, but the 
circumstances of the purchase grant discretion to the court to 
exempt the new employers from remedies in various amounts.62 
This places all the trade secrets of company A at risk, reducing 
its value and reducing the willingness of company B to acquire 
it.  Creating appropriate assurances to guarantee the 
confidentiality agreements of employees of company A results in 
higher transaction costs. 
These problems require solutions that would reduce 
litigation costs when employees transfer to other companies, i.e., 
solutions that shorten legal proceedings and enable the free 
movement of employees.  Similarly, solutions are needed to 
reduce the risks and existing uncertainty in performing rights 
transactions.  Employers’ confidence in employing workers can 
be increased by reducing the risk of misappropriation of secrets, 
so that the owner of the right to a trade secret can efficiently 
maximize its value.  The number of existing risks in carrying out 
trade secret transactions, compared with similar patent 
transactions, is likely to reduce greatly the number of 
transactions in rights to trade secrets by way of sale, licensing, 
mortgaging, and creation of partnerships.  These assumptions 
 
61. See supra note 39. 
62. See supra note 12. Regarding English and Australian law, see also 
supra note 39. 
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/1
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were borne out by studies that examined their accuracy.63  Based 
on an appraisal of the efficiency of the market of trade secret 
transactions compared with the efficiency of the patent system, 
it may be presumed that this market is not as developed as it 
could be.64  In other words, despite the fact that the number of 
rights to information protected by trade secret law is apparently 
greater than the number of rights to information protected by 
patents, the number of patent transactions greatly exceeds the 
number of trade secret transactions.  In my opinion, this 
situation does not stem from a lack of desire to make trade secret 
transactions, but rather from the absence of sufficient legal 
certainty in carrying out transactions in this right.  The proof of 
this presumption lies in the fact that when efforts are made to 
create arrangements that reduce the risk of conducting 
transactions in rights to trade secrets, as shown in the next part, 
many companies express interest in such services. 
 
 
63. The intent is transactions in a trade secret as an asset in its own right 
and not as part of a general sale of companies or businesses. In a study that 
examined approximately 150 contracts for licenses for ideas, it transpired that 
the ratio between the licenses for trade secrets and the licenses for patents is 
one to ten. This finding, however, is subject to a reservation. Unlike the case 
of patents, it is not possible to count the number of trade secrets in existence 
or the overall number of licenses granted with respect to them. Nevertheless, 
this finding is consistent with the estimation of several legal commentators. 
See Cheung, supra note 20, at 44-45. Although Cheung views this study as 
providing relatively weak evidence owing to the reservation noted above, the 
conclusion is supported, in his opinion, by the impression of other legal 
commentators cited by him: ARTHUR H. SEIDEL, WHAT THE GENERAL 
PRACTITIONER SHOULD KNOW ABOUT PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE (1956); SEIDEL 
& PANITCH, supra note 23 . Note that there is a lack of data regarding the 
licensing of patents (and, a fortiori, regarding licensing of trade secrets) and 
this topic was even suggested for an empirical study. See Mark .A. Lemley, 
Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 34 (2001). Indeed, in 
the course of the “Carnegie Mellon Survey,” the income from the licensing of 
patents was examined as a motivation for receiving a patent, and it was 
revealed that this was one of the least emphasized reasons, as opposed to 
others. Therefore, it was concluded that only a small portion of the existing 
and future population of patent holders is of the opinion that they could 
conduct transactions in this right. Later it transpired, however, that the 
motivation for conducting negotiations, which was seen to be a significant 
motivation, also included income from licensing, and therefore these results 
are not unequivocal and vary with the type of industry. See Cohen et al., supra, 
note 3, at 17-24, Fig. 7-8 & Table 8-9. 
64. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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VI. The Escrow Companies and the Indonesian Law 
 
It is a well-established fact that the law lags behind 
technological development and does not address the many 
difficulties that arise as a result of the fast pace of change.  In 
the trade secrets context, the lacuna resulting from the absence 
of legal solutions has led to the establishment of private 
companies that provide services to deal with the certain aspects 
of these problems.  These companies offer, among others, to 
allow customers to deposit their trade secrets with them in trust 
(hereinafter “escrow companies”).65  Some allow only physical 
deposits, but most of the companies allow deposits through 
encrypted communications.  The deposits are date-stamped.  
The escrow companies provide services to many entities, 
including Fortune 500 companies, capital risk funds, financial 
institutions, law firms, educational institutions, and 
governmental agencies.66  The existence of these companies 
attests not only to the need for such services, but also to the fact 
that companies availing themselves of these services do not 
hesitate to send their secret information through encrypted 
communications to the escrow companies.  They are not 
concerned about the fact that their secret information will be 
held in coded and secure form in one place together with trade 
secrets of many other companies, something that would seem to 
offer an incentive to hackers of encryption systems and 
networks.  Experience shows that concerns in this area are not 
 
65. See, e.g., ESCROWTECH, www.escrowtech.com, (last visited Jan. 29, 
2015) (founded in 1992); ESCROW EUROPE, www.escroweurope.com (last visited 
Jan. 29, 2015) (founded in 1989). An institution in Ecuador operates as a data 
bank for traditional knowledge. Communities of native citizens can deposit the 
traditional knowledge preserved by them in a secret file (each community has 
exclusive access to its file). If the information deposited is considered a trade 
secret, the government assists the community in negotiating with various 
entities through a material transfer agreement. The profit from the 
agreements is divided between the government and the community. Profits of 
the community are used to finance special projects for the community. See 
STEPHEN A. HANSEN & JUSTIN W. VANFLEET, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 29 (2003). 
66. See, e.g., EscrowTech – The Right Choice!, ESCROWTECH INT’L, INC., 
www.escrowtech.com/about_escrowTech.php (last visited Jan. 29, 2015); see 
also Electronic Deposit Submissions, ESCROWTECH INT’L, INC., 
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justified.  The escrow companies address some of the problems 
we have described, and with their help, it is possible to save 
some of the litigation and transaction costs that we pointed out 
above.  Below is a list of problems that can be overcome by using 
escrow services.67 
A.  The deposit of information to be offered in negotiations in 
order to prove that the offeror was the owner of the trade secret 
before the negotiations. Such a deposit can also protect the 
offeree company because the commitment not to use the 
information disclosed in the course of the negotiations pertains 
only to the information deposited by the offeror before the 
beginning of negotiations. Similarly, the routine deposit of 
information by the offeree company can prove that the 
information was in its possession before the negotiations. This 
proof is important given the existing exception that provides 
that the commitment not to use information disclosed during 
negotiations does not apply to information known to the offeree 
before the beginning of negotiations. 
B.  Deposit of secret information for the purpose of proving 
that the information was in the possession of the company when 
the former employee worked there. Such a deposit would avoid 
claims by former employees that the information was created 
after they had left the company and that the information was 
not known to the company when they worked there.  The escrow 
companies allow businesses to deposit their secret information 
without having to distinguish the amount of information known 
to each individual employee.  When a company does not create 
individualized deposits, there is no solution to the litigation 
problem of a company falsely arguing that the employee knew 
trade secrets to which he was not even exposed.  Similarly, there 
is no solution to the unsubstantiated claim by an employee that 
even if the information was known to the company, there is no 
proof that the employee was exposed to it.  These problems can 
be solved if the company creates individual deposits for each 
employee.  When such deposits are made in real time, in 
encrypted communication, it can be accomplished at a relatively 
low cost, as explained below.  Such a deposit can currently be 
 
67. IP Audit Trail Services, supra note 14; IP Collateral and Investment 
Protection Service, supra note 55. 
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accomplished through the services of escrow companies. 
Nevertheless, the law must create legal incentives to encourage 
companies to update the registration and to discourage over-
registration. 
C.  The deposit of secret information for the purpose of 
mortgaging it to a lender. The secret information cannot be 
expunged from the deposit, and therefore the lender can rely on 
the secret information as collateral.  Dating the deposit of the 
information precludes an argument by company owners, or by 
their employees, that the secret information in their possession 
was created only after they had left the company and therefore 
the mortgage does not apply to them.  Relating the mortgage to 
secret information deposited in a particular box with the escrow 
company can provide a solution to the problem of separating and 
distinguishing between the various trade secrets of the owner of 
the secret at issue, if he is interested in mortgaging only one 
trade secret. 
As far as we know, the services offered by the escrow 
company do not address the public registration of the identity of 
the owners of trade secret rights.  The only official mechanism 
of which we are aware that deals with the registration of the 
identity of the purchasers and receivers of licenses to trade 
secret rights is the law enacted in Indonesia in 2000, which 
regulates the trade secret laws in that country.  This law created 
a unique system according to which the transfer or licensing of 
a trade secret must be in writing and documented in the Office 
of the Directorate General of Intellectual Property in the 
Indonesian Ministry of Justice.  After the document is deposited, 
a notice of the transfer or licensing is published in special trade 
secret gazettes.68  The transfer or licensing of a trade secret that 
is not documented as described above has no validity with 
respect to third parties.69 
The services offered by the escrow companies and the 
 
68. Law on Trade Secret, No. 30, Art. 5 (5), 8(3) (2000) (Indon.). 
69. Law on Trade Secret, No. 30, Art. 5-10 (2000) (Indon.).  It seems that 
it is required to deposit only the transfer or licensing agreement, whereas the 
trade secret itself, which is to be held in confidence, cannot be deposited. As 
discussed below, this method has many shortcomings, which would not be 
resolved even if it were necessary to deposit the secret itself. These 
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Indonesian legislative mechanism offer solutions for only some 
of the problems that we have described.  For example, they do 
not provide a solution for cases in which a “new employer” did 
not know that the potential new employee is subject to a duty of 
confidentiality with respect to his former employer or his 
proxies.  Similarly, these arrangements do not solve the problem 
that arises when a former employee proposes to sell the trade 
secret of his former employer to a third party, stating that it is 
his trade secret.  Therefore, companies that negotiate with a 
person representing himself as the owner of a trade secret 
cannot be certain that the secret is his, even if he previously 
deposited it with an escrow company.  The possibility of 
mortgaging a trade secret through an escrow company is 
appropriate for static trade secrets, in which there is no ongoing 
development, such as a given formula.  In most cases, trade 
secrets are dynamic and the lender is interested in the mortgage 
applying to the developing trade secret.  For this purpose, an 
incentive is needed for the owner of the secret to update the 
information deposited for the purpose of the mortgage. 
The duty included in Indonesian law to document every 
transfer or license of trade secret rights in the official state office 
and in the gazette of trade secrets for the purpose of validity with 
respect to third parties provides only a partial solution.  For 
example, if C knows that A sold a trade secret to B in the past 
(from perusal of the gazette), and now A is offering to sell a trade 
secret to C, claiming that it is a different trade secret, C cannot 
know whether A is deceiving him, trying to sell him a trade 
secret that he has already sold to B (C has no right to see the 
trade secret that was sold to B).  A similar problem occurs when 
C knows that in the past A gave B an exclusive license to use a 
trade secret, and now A is offering C a license to use the trade 
secret, claiming that it is a different one.  C cannot know that A 
may be trying to defraud him by proposing a license for the same 
trade secret for which B holds an exclusive license.  Another 
problem occurs if C knows that in the past B received a license 
for a trade secret from A, and now B proposes that C purchase 
the trade secret, stating that this is a different trade secret.  C 
cannot know whether B is deceiving him, attempting to sell him 
a trade secret to which he merely has an exclusive license.  The 
Indonesian law is also unable to address cases in which former 
29
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employees offer for sale the secrets of their former employer. 
The problem with escrow companies is that they function, 
among others, as companies that accept the deposit of trade 
secrets in trust, and not as a public registry, the objective of 
which is to disclose certain data to the public.  The limitation of 
their services enables them to provide a solution only to the first 
level of problems, and they do not provide an overall solution to 
the complete array of problems described above.  The difficulty 
with the Indonesian law is that trade secrets involved in 
transactions are not deposited with an objective entity that can 
compare the trade secrets of past transactions with those of new 
transactions proposed by parties to the previous transactions. 
The absence of a deposit procedure also precludes locating 
former employees who are offering for sale, as their own, the 
trade secret of the former employer.  The inability to compare 
trade secrets allows too much room for fraud. 
 
VII. The Proposed Registry for Trade Secrets 
 
In the previous sections, I showed that when it comes to 
transaction costs, the option of patenting is preferable to trade 
secrecy.  The advantage of patents is manifest also with respect 
to litigation costs, unless the defendant challenges the validity 
of the patent, or if the defendant circumvented the patent by 
“designing around” it.  The effectiveness of the proposed registry 
for trade secrets should be judged, therefore, on its ability to 
decrease transaction and litigation costs, as well as the financing 
and employment cost, created by trade secrets law in such a way 
that its benefits exceed the costs of establishing the registry, of 
its operation, and the additional public costs listed below. 
When there are deliberations in a given legal system about 
how rights to a certain asset should be regulated and about the 
means of transferring those rights, it is necessary to consider 
two important factors: the means of acquiring the initial 
ownership of the asset, and the means for transferring 
ownership of the asset and for creating secondary rights with 
respect to it.70  Generally, there are three methods of acquiring 
 
70. Robert Nozick is of the opinion that property laws must include only 
three rules: a.) A rule detailing what is permissible seizure that confers upon 
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/1
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rights to assets and of transferring of these rights. According to 
the first method, acquisition of the rights is created by 
possession, and transfer of the rights is completed with the 
transfer of the possession.  According to the second method, 
acquisition of the rights is created by registration with a registry 
that regulates the rights of the asset, and the transfer of the 
rights is accomplished strictly by transferring these rights in the 
registry.  There are substantive disadvantages to both these 
methods.  In the first method there are high costs incurred 
because of the need to protect the possession of the asset as a 
way of serving public notice of ownership.71  Furthermore, 
possession is weaker than registration in its effectiveness as a 
public sign of ownership.  Possession does not clarify the 
substance of the possessor’s right,72 and it is difficult to split the 
right into secondary rights when the public notice is based 
exclusively on possession.  With the second method, a difficulty 
arises with respect to assets that have not yet been registered. 
The exclusivity granted by the registry relates only to registered 
assets, and only for those can the ownership right or secondary 
rights (such as tenancy, mortgage) be realized or transferred to 
others.  In other words, it is not possible to realize ownership 
rights or secondary rights of an asset that is not registered.73 
There is a third method, however, that integrates the two 
other methods. The first right of ownership is based strictly on 
possession, and once that has been proven, the right can be 
 
the one seizing the first right to ownership of a resource with no previous 
owners; b.) A rule detailing what constitutes valid, willful transfer of a certain 
resource from its lawful owner to its new owner; c.) A rule detailing how the 
existing ownership structure needs to be corrected when it transpires that one 
of the preceding rules has been violated. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE 
AND UTOPIA 150-53, 160 (1974). 
71. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 101-04. As an example of assets in which 
possession is the source of the foundation of property rights, Professor Posner 
cites wild animals, treasures and other examples. Id.; see also Carol M. Rose, 
Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73 (1985). 
72. As opposed to a registry that accurately records the substance of the 
registered right such as ownership, tenancy, mortgage, etc. One who possesses 
an asset may be the owner, tenant, borrower, bailee, owner of a right to a lien, 
retailer in consignment transactions, or thief. The public nature of the 
possession does not attest with certainty to the existence of the possessor’s 
right, nor does it attest to the content of this right. Possession attests to the 
possibility that the possessor has some right to the possessed asset. 
73. Posner, supra note 1, at 101-02. 
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registered. The transfer of rights and the splitting of the right 
into secondary rights is accomplished exclusively within the 
framework of the registry.  This solves several problems: (a) 
creating an ownership right over an asset that has not yet been 
registered; (b) reducing the cost of maintaining the public nature 
of the right (the cost of the public notice provided through the 
registry is necessarily lower than the costs of protecting a 
possession); and (c) transferring and splitting the rights, which 
can be accomplished with greater efficiency through the registry. 
In other words, the registry must be declarative regarding the 
creation of the first ownership right, and constitutive with 
respect to the performance of transactions regarding the right 
and the splitting of the right into secondary rights.74 
Another key question focuses on the nature of the potential 
asset that is to be regulated by the trade secret registry.  Is a 
trade secret an appropriate asset for regulation by a registry? 
Should the creation of a right of first ownership through 
possession or a substitute for possession, and transactions with 
respect to it be carried out only through the registry?  Professor 
Miguel Deutch proposed regarding the obligation to take 
security measures in trade secret law, among others, a 
requirement for meeting public notice demands.  The public 
notice inherent in the means of security stems from the fact that, 
when a person uses security measures he demonstrates control 
over the information.  Control is the essence of possession, and 
possession is one of the main sources of the characteristic of 
public notice.  Taking security measures serves notice of the 
existence of rights.  A person who is confronted with measures 
of security, such as a safe or the fence of a factory, generally 
knows that control is exercised over the information protected 
by the security measures, and that the owner claims the rights 
to such information.75  Note that this is not a question of making 
 
74. See Posner, supra note 1, at 101-05. For the importance of the registry 
as a means of splitting property rights efficiently, so that concurrent secondary 
rights and future rights with respect to the asset can be given, see Douglas 
Baird & Thomas Jackson, Information, Uncertainty and the Transfer of 
Property, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 299, 303-04 (1984); Richard A. Epstein, Notice and 
Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1354-56 
(1982). 
75. See Deutch, supra, note 7, at 329-32; Don Wiesner & Anita Cava, 
Stealing Trade Secrets Ethically, 47 MD. L. REV. 1076, 1114-15 (1988). 
32http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/1
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the information itself public, which would end the right to a 
trade secret, but rather making public the identity of the one 
who controls the information.  Therefore, with trade secrets, the 
means of providing public notice for the purpose of creating 
initial ownership rights is accomplished through the 
requirement of taking security measures, which is, as stated, a 
substitute for possession.  But can a trade secret be regulated 
through a registry after its ownership has been established by 
means of security measures?  Indeed, the existence of the 
registry does not void the requirement to take security 
measures.76  As such, the registry does not play a role as a factor 
of public notice that replaces the requirement of retaining 
possession (control).  The proposed registry for trade secrets can 
play the role of registries by improving the efficiency of 
transactions in the right to the trade secret and in splitting the 
right into secondary rights. 
I have found that the initial ownership right of a trade 
secret can be established by means of security measures, as a 
substitute for possession demonstrated by public notice.  The 
question is whether the trade secret can be appropriately 
regulated through a registry after the law has already 
recognized the ownership of the owner who has taken security 
measures.  To answer this question, it may be stated that an 
asset must have two main characteristics in order to be 
regulated through the registry.77  First the transfer of rights to 
the asset must occur infrequently.  If the rights to an asset are 
transferred too frequently (as in the case of diamonds), it is not 
appropriate to regulate it through the registry because the 
registration would have to be updated constantly.  The trade 
secret market is already slow because of its high transaction 
costs, therefore the creation of a registry for conducting rights 
transactions does not slow down the pace of their performance, 
but rather improves their efficiency and increases the pace at 
which they occur.  Second the asset must be of a relatively high 
value because of the high cost of using the registry method. 
Payment of registration fees that are high relative to the low 
 
Regarding the requirement to take security measures, see supra note 7. 
76. Because it has additional reasons beyond being the factor of public 
notice. See, e.g., Deutch, supra note 7, at 332-33. 
77. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 74, at 304, 306. 
33
  
488 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  35:2 
value of the asset is not efficient.  The trade secrets of companies 
are generally considered to be business assets of great value.78 
The costs involved in maintaining a registry are covered by the 
fees paid by companies using the registry.  These costs are 
justified if the registry improves the efficiency of the trade secret 
transactions market and at the same time reduces litigation 
costs.  The proof is that private bodies, like the escrow 
companies, which perform the first-level functions of the 
proposed registry, operate as businesses and are financed by the 
clients who use their services. 
 
A.  The Registry Structure 
 
Registration in the proposed registry for trade secrets would 
be carried out by sending encrypted information through the 
Internet79 or over a direct line (point-to-point). The deposited 
information would be saved encrypted even after its deposit with 
the registry, so that the content of the registered trade secrets 
remains secret from the public.80  The registration of trade 
secrets would be renewed in real time.  At any given time, the 
information must be signed with an approved electronic 
signature and deposited with the registrar of trade secrets.  The 
signature delineates the scope of the information, prevents 
making changes to it, and ratifies the identity of the provider of 
 
78. See Bone, supra note 4, at 243; Cheung, supra note 20, at 40; Deutch, 
supra note 7, at 362; Epstein & Levi, supra note 2, at 887; Friedman, Landes 
& Posner, supra note 4, at 61; Hill, supra note 2, at 2; Pamela Samuelson, 
Information as Property: Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal a Changing 
Decision in Intellectual Property Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 365, 367 (1989); see 
also Rockwell Graphic Sys. Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir. 
1991). 
79. Sending encrypted information through the Internet does not cause 
publication of the information, and it therefore does not affect the suitability 
of the information as a trade secret.  See GRAHAM J. H. SMITH, INTERNET LAW 
AND REGULATIONS 55 (3d ed. 2002). 
80. The information is encoded by symmetrical encryption when the key 
to the code is held by the depositor and the key for decoding the encryption by 
the registrar of trade secrets (this in case the depositor is close enough to the 
place of the registry in order to exchange keys), or by asymmetrical coding, 
when the depositor codes the information with the public key of the registry of 
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the information81 and the date and time when the information 
was deposited or updated.  The secret information is updated in 
a particular file and catalogued in the registry, so that each 
update replaces the earlier one.  The registrar of trade secrets 
and his employees can peruse the registered trade secrets as 
part of exercising various judicial powers, as described below. 
The registrar of trade secrets would have the coding keys for the 
purpose of carrying out these functions.  The registrar would 
have the authority of hiring experts in various fields to assist 
him in exercising his judicial powers.  The registrar, his 
employees, and the experts who assist him in his work are bound 
by a duty of confidentiality, similar to that of the registrar of 
patents and his employees. 
One of the key questions in establishing a registry is 
whether it operates as a constitutive registry or simply as a 
declarative one.  In this regard, it is necessary to distinguish 
between the creation of the initial right of ownership and 
carrying out of transactions involving the right.  In the case of a 
constitutive registry, it is not possible to acquire the initial right 
of ownership except through the registration.82  A declarative 
registry, however, makes it possible to acquire initial ownership 
rights even in the absence of registration.  With respect to 
transactions of assets, if the registry is constitutive, only 
registration can create the property rights or confer their 
validity to third parties.83  But in the case of declarative 
registries, registration does not create the property right or 
confer validity with respect to third parties, but merely declares 
the existence of the transactions.  In these registries, the 
registration does not determine the identity of the owners at any 
given moment. 
 
81. The identification is by means of additional coding in which the 
depositor codes the information with his private key and the registrar decodes 
the information with the depositor’s public key. Success in decoding proves that 
the information is that of the depositor and that it had not been altered after 
it was sent. Another person trying to decode the information with the 
depositor’s public key will not be able to access the information because it was 
coded with symmetrical or asymmetrical coding, as stated. See supra note 80. 
82. For example, it is possible to acquire the ownership right of a patent 
only by registration with the patent registry. 
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Constitutive registries have clear advantages when it comes 
to transactions of rights.  For example, the constitutive 
registration encourages owners of the rights to register their 
rights.  Registration with constitutive registries confers much 
greater certainty regarding the state of the rights of the assets 
at any given moment.  This method, which ensures that 
maximum rights to the asset are reflected in the registry, 
strengthens the efficiency and trustworthiness of the registry. 
Transactions that have not been registered undermine these 
objectives.  The reliability of the registry and its public nature 
are important for actions conducted by government authorities. 
They are also important for the benefit of citizens, so that at any 
given moment they can ascertain the state of the rights of the 
asset (with certain exceptions) that they are interested in 
acquiring or receiving as collateral for a loan they intend to 
grant.  Reliance on the registry requires that the asset 
transactions be registered with it.  Otherwise, it is impossible 
for government authorities and citizens to rely on the 
registrations.  Therefore, giving the registry the power of a 
constitutive registry creates rights that are much more effective 
in achieving the objectives of the registry, i.e., the creation of a 
public tool that accurately reflects the state of the asset rights 
regulated by the registry, and enables users to rely on it. 
Admittedly, there are declarative registries that are reliable, but 
empowering a registry as a constitutive registry facilitates 
reliance at a higher level.  Moreover, one of the objectives of 
creating a constitutive registry is to prevent a former owner from 
deceitfully “selling” an asset. 
Despite these advantages, a constitutive registry has 
disadvantages as well.  A mandatory determination of the date 
of transfer of ownership deviates from the principle of freedom 
to contract and does not allow the parties to set another date. 
Another disadvantage is a slowing down of market transactions. 
By its nature, a constitutive registry slows the speed of 
transactions for assets subject to registration.  Transfer of 
ownership of the asset requires a change of registration, and 
cannot be achieved by agreement or transfer of possession, 
which are relatively quick procedures.  The slowdown of the 
transaction market is a disadvantage for assets in an otherwise 
fast-moving transaction market, as in the case of the diamond 
36http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/1
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industry, but not particularly significant for assets for which the 
transaction market is already slow, regardless of the 
constitutive nature of the registry that regulates rights. 
The most important advantage of trade secrecy over patents 
protection is creative flexibility.  A severe disadvantage of the 
patent system is the high administrative cost incurred before the 
patent is issued.  Moreover, the registration process is relatively 
lengthy and inappropriate for information the economic value of 
which lasts only a relatively short period of time.  Preserving 
flexibility in creating the right to trade secrecy requires that the 
registry for trade secrets perform as a declarative registry in the 
matter of the creation of the right.  In other words, the operation 
of the registry should not change the process of creating the right 
as it exists at present.  Meeting the preliminary conditions for 
creating the right grants the creator of the information 
ownership of the trade secret without any registration.  The 
public nature of the right, at this stage, is achieved through the 
requirement to take security measures as a substitute for 
possession. 
To increase the trustworthiness of the registry, however, 
and to enhance the legal certainty when carrying out 
transactions in the rights to trade secrets, the registry should 
operate as a constitutive registry only with regard to 
transactions in this right.  The registry should also make 
possible the efficient division of the right into secondary rights. 
These objectives are the primary justifications for the existence 
of registries.84  Establishment of a registry will reduce concerns 
about engaging in negotiations for rights to trade secrets, and 
the risk of fraudulent transactions will decline considerably. 
These procedures will also reduce transaction costs.  Granting 
constitutive powers to the registry in the matter of transactions 
for a right will advance this objective.  These objectives justify 
the cost of the burden required to use registries.  As noted, the 
imposition of a duty for carrying out transactions in a certain 
manner infringes on the freedom of contracts, and may slow 
down the pace of transactions.  But the concern for slowing down 
the pace of transactions seems unjustified with regard to the 
right to trade secrets.  The transaction market in this field is not 
 
84. See, in this regard, supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
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as developed as it could be, not for lack of a desire to transact in 
such assets but because of the amorphous nature of the right and 
the lack of legal certainty in purchasing it.  It seems, therefore, 
that the proposed registry will not slow down the pace of 
transactions in this right, but rather increase it through the 
creation of much greater certainty, as shown below.  A registry 
that acts as a declarative registry in creating an initial 
ownership right through possession and its substitutes, and as 
a constitutive registry in carrying out transactions in that right 
and creating secondary rights, is the most efficient registry from 
among the three choices presented above.  The registry for trade 
secrets that I propose operates in accordance with this option, 
i.e., as a declarative registry in the creation of initial ownership 
rights and as constitutive one with regard to transactions in this 
right and in the creation of secondary rights. 
The advantage of flexibility operates not only when it comes 
to the creation of initial ownership rights, but also with regard 
to ownership rights to the secret information that continues to 
be developed over time.  A trade secret that is developed on an 
on-going basis includes all its developments, without the need 
for a formal process.  To preserve the advantage of flexibility in 
such a case, it is not sufficient to shape the proposed registry as 
declarative when it concerns the creation of the right and as 
constitutive when it comes to transactions in the right.  After the 
creation of the right, registration should take place with a high 
frequency in order to keep the registration updated according to 
the developments that have occurred in the trade secret. 
Therefore, the proposed registry does not operate as a registry of 
rights but strictly as a registry of transactions. 
The essential difference between a registry of rights and a 
registry of transactions is that in the former there is a 
scrupulous examination, before the initial registration, of the 
suitability of the asset for registration and of the identity of its 
owners, whereas in the latter no such examination is 
conducted.85  This choice is mandated by circumstances.  As a 
result of the scrupulous examination process before the initial 
registration, the trade secrets law loses its advantage of 
 
85. Based on this test, it may be stated that the patent registry is a 
registry of rights. By contrast, the registries of security interests pursuant to 
U.C.C. art. 9. are only transaction registries. 
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flexibility and becomes similar in its essential features to the 
system of patent laws.  Therefore, trade secrets will be registered 
automatically, without prior examination of whether the 
information is qualified to be a trade secret, and without 
ascertaining that the person doing the registration is the owner 
of the trade secret.  The registration itself does not constitute 
proof that it is a trade secret.  On the contrary, even in the 
registries of rights it is possible to challenge the registration, 
stating that the asset does not qualify for registration or that the 
registered owner is not its true owner.86  The ability to challenge 
exists, a fortiori, with regard to a transaction registry as a 
registry of trade secrets, in which no preliminary examination is 
conducted before the registration.  The owner of the registered 
trade secret is vulnerable to the possibility of being challenged 
with the argument that the asset is not qualified to be a trade 
secret or that he is not the owner of the trade secret.  This 
examination occurs only after the fact, in a hearing before the 
registrar of trade secrets or in court. 
Establishing the registry as declarative with regard to the 
creation of the right, and as constitutive regarding transactions 
in the right, and moreover, as a registry that operates only as a 
transaction registry, preserves flexibility at the stage of the 
creation of the right and inspires greater confidence in 
conducting transactions in rights to trade secrets.  The registries 
generate confidence in the transactions of an asset arranged by 
them by providing a guarantee to those who rely on the 
registration and by eliminating the ability to deprive the owner 
of his right without his consent.87  In the following parts, I 
discuss the special rules to partially achieve these objectives. 
The proposed registry serves two main types of registering 
entities.  The first includes companies or individuals who 
register as owners of a trade secret.  This type of registration is 
intended to serve such actions as the sale of the trade secret, the 
granting of a license for a trade secret, and the mortgaging of a 
trade secret.  According to trade secrets law, if two strangers 
independently discover secret information, each of them 
individually is considered the owner of the secret,88 and may 
 
86. Regarding the registration of patents, see supra note 5. 
87. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
88. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
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register the trade secret under her name.  Therefore, there is no 
need for a mechanism, similar to that of a patents registry, that 
examines who was first to register the trade secret.89  By 
contrast, if the owner of a trade secret wishes to register another 
trade secret, already having registered one trade secret, the 
trade secret registrar, in order to prevent fraud, must ensure 
that the latter registration is identical to the first one, as 
described below. 
The efficiency of the registry depends on it being constantly 
updated.  It is therefore of utmost importance that the transfer 
of the right from a seller to a buyer be reflected in the registry. 
Transactions that are not registered in the registry undermine 
its purpose.  Treating the trade secret registry as a constitutive 
registry with regard to the registration of transactions would 
provide incentives for the registration of transactions of trade 
secrets.  This, in turn, would increase the credibility and 
improve the reliability of the registry.  A transaction in a 
registered trade secret that does not culminate in registration 
would be void against any buyer, mortgagee, or licensee who 
registered in good faith and for consideration, unless the first 
transaction would be registered in the registry within three 
months from the date on which it was executed or before the date 
of the last purchase, mortgaging, or licensing.90 
Because the proposed registry operates as a constitutive 
registry for the purpose of conducting transactions in rights of 
trade secrets, these transactions can be carried out only if the 
trade secrets are registered in the registry.  If a trade secret has 
not yet been registered, the owner of the trade secret would be 
required to register the secret under her name before she can 
carry out transactions with respect to the secret.  Similarly to 
the first registration of trade secrets, transactions in a registered 
trade secret would be possible only in electronic form, and 
therefore it would be necessary to identify the contracting 
parties.91  The possibility of carrying out transactions through 
 
89. Because the right to a patent is an exclusive one, it requires an 
arrangement with respect to the priority of registration. 
90. Similar to the existing law concerning the transfer of a patent that 
was not registered.  See supra note 52. 
91. The owner of the secret and the other party to the transaction (buyer, 
licensee, lender who wishes to obtain a mortgage on the secret, etc.) identify 
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electronic form does not stem from a requirement to carry out 
the transactions quickly.  Unlike the update of a registered trade 
secret that develops on an ongoing basis and therefore requires 
updating in real time, transactions in trade secrets do not 
require such speed.  The possibility, however, is necessary in 
order to enable the registry to operate as an international 
registry.  Furthermore, the trade secret registry advances the 
additional objective of a more efficient use of the asset by 
splitting of the right into secondary rights.92 
The second category of potential registering entities 
includes companies and individuals who are also registered as 
the owners of a trade secret.  However this category is different 
from the first in that together with the registration of ownership, 
the names of individuals who have undertaken a contractual 
obligation to maintain the secrecy of the registered information 
is also be registered (hereinafter, the subordinates).  The names 
of the owners of the rights and of the subordinates would be open 
to the general public.  The registry indexes the names of the 
owners of the various rights and of the subordinates.  Anyone 
may peruse the registry to check whether a person is subject to 
a duty of confidentiality to someone else.  The names of the 
subordinates would remain registered even after ownership of 
the secret has been transferred to another entity. 
To the best of my knowledge, there is no trade secret 
registry in any legal system in the form proposed here.  This is 
not surprising, because the main requirement for recognizing 
information as a trade secret is the confidentiality of the 
information, whereas a main objective for the establishment of 
the registries is to make the registered information available to 
the public.93  As noted, I propose a registry that is in part secret 
 
themselves according to the normal procedure of identification of the provider 
of information.  See supra note 81. For the trend of development of land 
registries that allow online transactions see Haim Sandberg, Real Estate E-
Conveyancing: Vision and Risks 19 INFO. & COMM’S TECH. LAW 101 (2010). 
92. See supra note 84. 
93. Professor Miguel Deutch and Robert Dean noted that there is no 
possibility of establishing a system of registration for trade secrets.  Deutch, 
supra note 7, at 361-63; DEAN, supra note 39, at 84.  There were even those who 
called the expression “public registration of trade secrets” an "oxymoron.”  See 
RALPH H. FOLSOM, MICHAEL W. GORDON & JOHN A SPANOGLE, INTERNATIONAL 
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: A PROBLEM ORIENTED COURSEBOOK 889 (4th ed. 
1999).  But they referred to a registry where the assets registered, i.e., the 
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and in part public.  The information or know-how covered by the 
trade secret would be kept in the secret part of the registry, 
whereas the name of the owners and subordinates would be in 
the public part.  The role of the registry is to identify the owners 
of the trade secret rights, or those who have undertaken to 
maintain the confidentiality of the information, and to arrange 
the transactions that are carried out in the rights to the trade 
secrets, but not to disclose the secrets themselves. 
Registration of information as a trade secret with the 
proposed registry does not necessarily create the trade secret.  
Nor does registration serve as proof that the registered 
information is indeed a trade secret.  The question whether the 
registered information is a trade secret would only be 
determined at a court hearing, based on the preliminary 
requirements for the creation of a trade secret.  The ability to 
register a trade secret does not change these characteristics.  
The registry does not create the right and the registration does 
not confer a monopoly on the information, nor does it change the 
nature of the right and the scope of the protection it grants.  
 
trade secrets, would be open for public perusal, as in the case of the patent 
registry.  Such a registry is indeed impossible, because publication of the 
secrets would expropriate the rights applicable to them.  Professor Bone 
proposed creating a registry of disclosed information in an information bank 
that would constitute a substitute for the trade secret law method.  See Bone, 
supra note 2, at 125-28.  Bone proposes a method similar to the patent method, 
not a trade secret law method, and therefore it is not a registry for trade 
secrets.  The method suffers from some of the difficulties of patent law, and it 
is therefore not a proper substitute for the method of trade secret law and 
cannot take the place of the trade secret law.  The registry proposed here is 
intended to address some of the existing disadvantages of the trade secret law 
and not to replace it with an entirely different system.  Anderson suggested 
creating a registry for trade secrets for secret inventions, to serve two purposes: 
(a) prove that the owner of the secret deemed the information valuable and 
intended to keep it secret, and (b) if a patent is awarded to another person for 
the same invention, the registrant can continue using his invention based on 
the law Anderson proposed.  J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 917, 973-77 (2011).  I believe that the escrow companies 
can accomplish these objectives today.  Another proposal concerns the 
registration of trade secrets, with minimal disclosure, for other purposes.  See 
Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of 
Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2412-30 (1994); Jerome 
Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2545-58 (1994).  These proposals are different from the 




2014 TRADE SECRETS REGISTRY 497 
Therefore, the proposed registry does not change the existing 
balance in trade secret law between the public and the private 
interest, and does not undermine the patent registry.  The role 
of the proposed registry is to reduce litigation costs in cases of 
trade secret misappropriation by shortening the judicial process, 
and thus increase employee mobility (because the judicial 
decision is rendered before the new employment offer expires).  
Moreover, the registry increases certainty and confidence in 
transactions in trade secrets and reduces transaction costs, 
leading directly to the growth of information mobility.  The 
increase in information mobility in an honest way, which helps 
economic growth,94 also serves the rationale for a right to trade 
secret based on considerations of business ethics and fair 
competition.95 
 
B.  The Registry as a Tool for Public Notice 
 
One of the central principles of property law is that of public 
notice.  When one is interested in imposing liability or obligation 
on a third party who has no direct legal connection to the owner 
of the right, it is necessary to provide tools for public notice that 
can serve to warn the third party of the existence of rights on 
which it may be infringing.  The public source enables the third 
 
94. Bone, supra note 4, at 266-67 n.115; Hyde, supra note 4; AnnaLee 
Saxenian, Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and 
Route 128, 71 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 199, 206 (1994).  For a more reserved 
approach, see also Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High 
Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants not 
to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (1999). 
95. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481-82 (1974);  
Burten v. Milton Bradley Co., 763 F.2d 461, 467 (1st Cir. 1985); E.I. du Pont 
de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1015-17 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. 
denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971); R. B. STEVENSON, JR., CORPORATIONS AND 
INFORMATION: SECRECY, ACCESS AND DISCLOSURE 19 (1980); Deutch, supra note 
7, at 322, 358; Hill, supra note 2, at 2; Ramon Klitzke, Trade Secrets: Important 
Quasi-Property Rights, 41 BUS. LAW. 555, 557 (1986); Christopher Rebel J. 
Pace, The Case for a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 427, 435 
n.23 (1995); Peterson, supra note 2, at 451 n.563;  Sharp Paine, supra note 54, 
at 250, 254-59; Wiesner & Cava, supra note 75; Steven Wilf, Trade Secrets, 
Property and Social Relations, 34 CONN. L. REV. 787 (2002); see also UTSA § 1 
cmt.; HANOCH DAGAN, UNJUST ENRICHMENT: A STUDY OF PRIVATE LAW AND 
PUBLIC VALUES 101-02, 107 (1997) (emphasizing that the rationale behind the 
right to trade secrecy is “propriety of means.”). 
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party to become informed about the existence of the right.  This 
makes possible the imposition of liability and obligation on a 
third party acting in good faith, if there is justification for doing 
so.  The four main public sources that the law recognizes are 
registry, possession, notice, and government publications.96  As 
noted, physical measures of security can be used as a public 
source for the identity of the owner of the rights in trade secrets, 
as a substitute for possession.97  Another tool that can serve as 
a source for public notice is a notice of secrecy.98  These two 
sources of public notice are intended for cases in which the secret 
was appropriated by improper means, ignoring the physical 
measures of security and the notice of confidentiality.99 
The existence of a public source at the time the right was 
created appears to be sufficient, even if the asset was transferred 
to a third party who was not exposed to the public source.  For 
example, if a person breaks into a safe that was used as a 
security measure and as a public source, and steals the trade 
secrets from it, then transfers them to a third party, the third 
party is not exposed to the public source.  This is the situation 
with regard to the possession of movable property.  For example, 
if a person steals a mobile phone and transfers it to a third party, 
the owner can retrieve it from the third party even if the latter 
was not exposed to the source of public notice – the possession. 
Because of various policy considerations, the power invested in 
the right to trade secret is different from that invested in 
property rights (in rem): when the thief transfers a trade secret 
to the third party, the latter is liable only if he knew, or should 
 
96. Another relative and weakened source of public notice stems from the 
characteristic of the secret itself. A person in a certain professional field who 
comes across information of which he was not previously aware, can assume 
that this is a trade secret even if he does not know who the owner of the rights 
to the information is. A similar principle exists with respect to copyrights. The 
existence of the work itself constitutes public notice as to its existence, even if 
it does not disclose the identity of its owner, and even if it is not clear whether 
the period of copyright protection has expired. Deutch, supra note 7, at 327, 
363-64. 
97. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
98. The reference is to the writing of the word “secret” on a document, 
disc, at the beginning of a file, etc. The notice is also used as a tool of public 
notice in copyright law by means of the “notice of copyright,” e.g., indicating 
the name of the author and the year in which the work was created, with the 
addition of the copyright symbol, “©.” 
99. See UTSA § 1(2)(ii)(A). 
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have known, at the time he received or used the information, 
that this was a stolen trade secret.100 
Frequently the two sources of public notice, security 
measures and notice of confidentiality, are irrelevant.  Most 
secret information is not kept behind fences but it is rather 
stored in the minds of employees who go home and who 
occasionally change their place of employment.  With regard to 
this type of information, there is no significance to physical 
security measures, either as a means of protecting the secret or 
as a source of public notice of the right.  In such cases, the most 
common means of security is a contractual agreement (i.e., a 
commitment to preserve confidentiality).101   Unlike the fence of 
a factory, which warns a third party, contractual agreements are 
not made public and therefore cannot serve as a source of public 
notice.  Therefore, the proposed registry of trade secrets also 
functions as a third source of public notice. 
In the proposed structure, each company can register, in a 
separate registry cell, every employee who is bound by 
confidentiality concerning the trade secrets to which he has been 
exposed.  The company is registered as the owner, and the 
employee as subject to a duty of confidentiality to the owner of 
the deposited trade secret.  Updating the trade secrets to which 
the employee has been exposed is carried out in real time 
through encrypted communications.  For example, software that 
was written and updated by an employee is sent to his box in the 
trade secret registry at the end of each workday through 
encrypted communication, each update replacing the previous 
one.  When secret information is updated less frequently, the 
trade secrets can be registered once a week, or on some other 
cyclical basis, as decided by the company.102  For the purpose of 
 
100. See supra note 39. See also Professor Deutch’s opinion according to 
which this means of public notice (security measures) is sufficient to impose 
liability even on a third party acting in good faith, in comparison to holding 
chattel, if this power was indeed worthy in light of the policy considerations.  
Deutch, supra note 7, at 329-30. For a different view, see DEAN, supra note 39, 
at 83-84. 
101. In this regard, see Rockwell Graphic Sys. Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 
925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir. 1991); Valco Cincinnati, Inc. v. N&D Machining 
Serv. Inc., 492 N.E.2d 814, 819 (Ohio 1986). 
102. Regarding the great importance of documenting trade secrets and 
dating the information being developed, including the identity of the persons 
exposed to trade secrets, and dating when they were exposed to the secret 
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periodic deposits in the registry, companies must establish a 
system for sending trade secrets to the registry.  As I have 
pointed out, some firms have already established such systems 
in order to work with the escrow companies.  Many companies 
have created systems for sending large amounts of accumulated 
information, including secret information, to external backup 
sites.103  A similar mechanism can serve also to send secret 
information to the trade secret registry. 
Based on the experience of escrow companies and backup 
sites, I conclude that companies are not concerned about sending 
their secret information by encrypted communication or about 
storing their secret information at the same site where many 
other trade secrets are stored.  Moreover, companies have 
learned that asset management occasionally requires reliance 
on other institutions that use security networks.  For example, 
almost all reasonable people and companies deposit one of their 
most important assets – their monetary savings – in bank 
accounts, despite the risk that the bank’s computer may be 
broken into and account registries distorted, causing them 
enormous damage.  Reasonable people consider the risk vs. the 
benefit and prefer to deposit their money in a bank because, 
among other considerations, they have arrived at the conclusion 
that elsewhere their money will be at an even greater risk.  
There were no reports that depositors closed their accounts even 
when bank computers were hacked and secret information 
stolen.  The concern over the misappropriation of trade secrets 
from the company itself exceeds the risk of depositing these 
secrets in the proposed registry.  Moreover, depositing trade 
secrets in the registry is intended, among others, to mitigate the 
damage caused when the misappropriation of a trade secret 
occurs by reducing the litigation costs incurred in such cases. 
 
information, see 1 M. F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 5:19 (2008). 
103. This phenomenon became common after the twin towers disaster, in 
the wake of which many companies were obliterated because, in the absence of 
off-site backups, all the information in their possession was destroyed.  
Concerns about fire, terrorist attacks, war, computer viruses, and other 
disasters served as the impetus for many companies to send their information 
to backup sites outside the company.  Given the great demand, at present many 
companies provide backup services through encoded communication, so that at 
the end of each workday all the information in the possession of the company, 
including its secret information, is sent to the site of the backup company. 
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Publicizing the identity of the individuals subject to the 
right enables the employer, when interviewing new employees, 
to query through the Internet the trade secret registry to make 
sure that the new employee is not bound by confidentiality 
toward a former employer.  This possibility raises several 
questions: (a) Do we expect the new employer to check the 
registry as part of the interview process for hiring new 
employees? (b) An affirmative answer to the first question 
requires a decision regarding the rule to be applied if the 
employer fails to check the registry.  In my opinion, the answer 
to the first question is derived from the answer to the second 
question.  As noted, the objective of the registration of those 
subject to the right to a trade secret is to create a source of public 
notice for the most common means of security: the obligation of 
contractual confidentiality.  This source of public notice is 
intended to serve in cases when it is alleged that a third party 
used the trade secret when he knew, or should have known, that 
the secret was made available to him by someone who had used 
it in violation of a contractual or fiduciary duty imposed upon 
him vis-à-vis the owner of the secret.104  The term “should have 
known” includes reasonable checks even if there was no 
suspicion of infringement.  As part of these checks, it is possible 
to require an examination of public registries.  In other words, a 
new employer is considered a tortfeasor, having committed the 
tort of misappropriation of a trade secret, even if he neither 
knew nor suspected that his new employee disclosed to him 
trade secrets of his previous employer, because it was possible 
for the new employer to use the registry to discover the new 
employee’s duty of confidentiality to his former employer, but he 
failed to conduct such an examination.  It is therefore 
appropriate to examine the question whether, in every 
employment interview, the employer has a duty to check the 
registry.   
One possibility is to require an examination of the registry 
only when hiring employees of certain occupations, when there 
is a high risk that they may possess trade secrets belonging to 
their previous employers.  For example, the burden applies in 
the hiring of a software engineer but not of a janitor. 
 
104. See UTSA § 1(2)(ii)(B)(III). 
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Furthermore, the burden applies to senior employees about 
whom it may be assumed that they possess trade secrets, but not 
to junior employees.  The hiring process generally tends to be 
lengthy and involves several interviews and tests, especially in 
the case of high-tech professionals and senior executives.  
Therefore, the burden of checking the registry does not affect the 
speed of recruiting new employees.  Another possibility is to 
impose a general obligation to conduct an examination, to avoid 
litigation costs if there is a question of whether the nature of the 
position or the seniority of the employee mandated an 
examination of the registry. 
The proposed trade secret registry completes the set of 
requirements for public notice of the right to trade secrets. The 
physical measures of security and the notice of confidentiality 
constitute a source of public notice for those who appropriate the 
secret through improper means.  In any event, those who use the 
secret in violation of a contractual or fiduciary duty do not need 
a source of public notice because they are aware of the existence 
of the right.  The trade secret registry constitutes a source of 
public notice for persons who suspect that they have received the 
secret from someone who has breached a contractual obligation 
to maintain confidentiality.  The source of public notice created 
by the trade secret registry can assist in preventing fraudulent 
transactions, in which a former employee tries to sell his former 
employer’s secret to the former employer’s competitors.  The 
three sources together form a web of public notice that enables 
the owner of a trade secret to warn the public of any 
infringements.  This reduces the employment costs, because it 
reduces concerns about hiring new employees and about the 
disclosing trade secrets to them. 
 
C. The Registry as a Tool for Resolving Disputes and Reducing 
the Evidentiary Gap Between the Parties 
 
In this part, I discuss the ability of the proposed registry to 
assist in the second stage, where the new employer does not 
want to assume the risk of committing the tort of trade secret 
misappropriation.  To this end, he examines the registry, 
becoming aware of his new employee’s obligation of 
confidentiality to the trade secret right of his former employer.  
48http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/1
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For example, if a software developer registered the secret code 
that the former employee developed for him, when the employee 
moves to a new place of employment, the new employer can 
learn, through a query to the registry, that as the developer of 
the program, the employee was subject to a duty of 
confidentiality to his former employer.  If the new employer 
decides to use the trade secrets regardless, not only does he 
assume the risk of paying damages to the former employer for 
the prohibited use, but he is also subject to injunctions that will 
prevent him from using the secret in the future despite his 
investments and his reliance on the secret.  An employer who 
does not want to risk an action for damages, an injunction, and 
injury to his reputation must ask the previous employer whether 
the former employee’s new work infringes upon his trade secrets.  
Because in most cases the answer is expected to be in the 
affirmative, the new employer or the former employee must 
request the registrar of trade secrets to hold an expedited 
judicial proceeding to answer the following questions: (a) Is the 
registered information indeed a trade secret of the former 
employer?105 (b) Is the former employee prevented from working 
for a competitor, and if so, for how long? 
The former employee can raise several claims in his defense: 
(a) the secret information, toward which he has a duty of 
confidentiality according to the registration in the registry, does 
not meet the definition of a trade secret (if this claim is accepted, 
the former employee can request the registrar of trade secrets to 
expunge the secret information in question); (b) the registered 
owner of the registered trade secret is not the true owner; (c) the 
general professional skills exception applies in this case;106 (d) 
the trade secret is not related to the work at the new place of 
employment. 
The law establishing the registry must grant the registrar 
of trade secrets several judicial powers for the purpose of making 
determinations in these cases.  Concentration of judicial powers 
in this field of expertise in the hands of a judicial entity 
specializing in this area makes possible the development of 
 
105. Sharp Paine noted that frequently disagreements arise whether 
given information meets the definition of a trade secret as well as about the 
identity of the owner of the secret. Sharp Paine, supra note 54, at 260. 
106. See supra note 11. 
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unique judicial expertise, similar to that of a registrar of patents.  
These judicial powers do not remove the jurisdiction of the courts 
to adjudicate claims of trade secret misappropriation that are 
not related to the ex ante restriction of occupation.  Claims 
regarding the limitation of occupation require, by their nature, 
quick resolution.  Therefore, in cases in which the claim for 
restriction of occupation fails, the offer of new employment is 
still relevant. 
The speed of the judicial process is determined by several 
factors.  One such factor limits the employer to claims for 
restriction of occupation only with regard to trade secrets that 
have been registered before the employee’s departure from his 
previous place of employment.  This limitation provides 
companies with the incentive to register separately the trade 
secrets that each employee knows.  By means of the registry, it 
is possible to know the date on which a trade secret was 
deposited, as well as the scope of the information deposited by 
the owner of the trade secret regarding the employee subject to 
the duty of confidentiality.  The certification of the registrar of 
trade secrets regarding the scope of the information deposited as 
of a given date constitutes prima facie evidence, or alternatively, 
absolute evidence regarding the scope of the information at that 
time.  The limitation of claims for restriction of occupation 
concerning a former employee to only those trade secrets that 
the former employer registered in the name of the employee 
before his leaving is intended to prevent situations in which 
companies claim that the employee knows trade secrets to which 
in practice he was not exposed, only in order to prevent the 
employee from moving to a competitor.  A substantial number of 
claims against former employees are filed before the beginning 
of their work at the new place of employment, based on the claim 
that the employee is expected to breach his obligation of 
confidentiality.  At times, even if the former employer does not 
succeed in his claim of restriction of occupation, by virtue of the 
duration of the litigation he achieves his objective, which is to 
block the employee from moving to a competitor.107  Naturally, 
this limitation does not prevent the former employer from suing 
 
107. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. Regarding problems that 
arise in the absence of a formal dimension of the scope of protected information, 
see Deutch, supra note 7, at 365. 
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the former employee or any other entity on the grounds of trade 
secret misappropriation that occurred in practice, even if the 
trade secrets were not registered in the registry.  For example, 
if it transpires that the former employee is indeed using trade 
secrets, the former employer can sue both the former employee 
and the new employer for trade secret misappropriation and on 
other grounds as well, and in addition to damages can obtain 
injunctions to prevent the continued use of the trade secrets 
(including restriction of occupation), but cannot obtain an ex ante 
order of restriction of occupation.108  Therefore, the requirement 
of registration in order to be able to sue for ex ante restriction of 
occupation does not negate the ex post defense of trade secrets 
that were not registered.   
The defense of these secrets is possible only if trade secret 
misappropriation actually occurred. Obtaining an order for ex 
ante restriction of occupation is possible only with respect to 
trade secrets registered before the employee has left the place of 
previous employment.  If the previous employer believes that the 
trade secrets in his possession are so valuable that restricting 
the occupation of the former employee and denying him his 
livelihood are justified, only because of concern that in the future 
she may make use of these trade secrets, the employer should 
take the trouble to register the trade secrets by means of online 
communication, even if this requires accommodating 
registration in real time (a process that already exists in many 
companies for the purpose of off-site backups or deposits with 
escrow companies, as noted above). This arrangement prevents 
extensive restrictions imposed on the mobility of employees by 
means of exaggerated claims that turn out to be baseless, but 
that achieve their goal of blocking the employee from 
transferring to a new employer because of the time that it takes 
to litigate such claims in court.  Making it more difficult to file 
claims for restriction of occupation is also consistent with the 
tendency of the courts to limit the restriction of occupation of 
former employees,109 and with studies that point to the fact that 
 
108. Proceedings in claims of trade secret misappropriation that 
happened in practice can be adjudicated before the registrar of trade secrets or 
before the court. 
109. Regarding the tendency of the courts to limit the restriction of 
occupation, see Sharp Paine, supra note 54, at 260. 
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the limitation of the restriction of occupation and the resulting 
increase in employee mobility, increase the mobility of 
information and assists in economic development.110 
As noted, one of the roles of the registry is streamlining the 
judicial process. To promote this goal, two alternatives may be 
examined to forestall arguments that are likely to be raised by 
the former employee: (a) establish that the former employee 
cannot claim that he was not exposed to a trade secret registered 
in his name before leaving his former job; and (b) establish the 
presumption that the former employee was indeed exposed to a 
trade secret registered in his name before leaving. The existence 
of the presumption shifts the burden of proof to the employee, 
who must prove that he was not exposed to the secret registered 
in his name.111  Each alternative has an advantage and a 
disadvantage.  An irrefutable presumption saves litigation costs, 
but does not permit the employee to prove that he was not 
exposed to the secret.  A refutable presumption enables the 
employee to prove that he was not exposed to the secret, but this 
nearly eliminates the narrowing of the evidentiary gap and 
reinstates the attendant litigation costs. 
One of the concerns with the proposed arrangement is that 
the company might register trade secrets under the name of 
employees who are not exposed to these secrets only in order to 
lengthen the litigation if these employee leave, with the objective 
of delaying the employees’ move to competitors.  In such a case, 
the employees will also be prevented from claiming that they 
were not exposed to the trade secret or that they will bear the 
burden of proof to refute the presumption (in accordance with 
the arrangement chosen).  To address this concern, it is proposed 
that in ex ante claims for restriction of occupation, the former 
employee (the defendant) be able to receive the information 
registered in his name in the registry.  This information would 
be exposed only at the judicial proceeding, subject to an order 
prohibiting its publication.112  On the face of it, the company may 
 
110. See supra note 94. 
111. See JAGER, supra note 102 at § 5:19. Jager determines that 
documentation in real time that a certain person was exposed to the secret 
information constitutes trustworthy evidence that such person had indeed 
access to the information. 
112. Regarding the constitutional problem regarding laws enabling the 
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be tempted, during the period of employment, to register under 
the employee’s name trade secrets of which he was not aware, 
merely in order to improve its position in future litigation.  But 
it may be assumed that the company is not interested in doing 
so because such secrets would have to be exposed in the court 
proceedings.  Although an order would prohibit publication, the 
company would be assuming an unnecessary risk by exposing 
secrets unknown to the employee merely to strengthen its claim, 
especially if the information is to be disclosed to the employee in 
the course of the dispute with the company.  This should deter 
the company from registering in the name of employees 
information to which they were not exposed.  The proposed 
arrangement takes into account considerations of freedom of 
occupation of the defendant and prevents baseless claims 
against former employees.  The arrangement also protects the 
trade secrets of the company, which would be exposed only in the 
course of the judicial process and subject to the order prohibiting 
their publication. 
 The proposed registry significantly reduces the evidentiary 
gap between the parties regarding the most important issue: the 
secrets to which the former employee was exposed.  The registry 
does so through a mechanism that establishes the facts with 
absolute certainty, or prima facie, depending on the 
arrangement chosen.  Such a mechanism can render 
unnecessary hearing the question whether the employee indeed 
knew the secrets.  The issues remaining to be determined by the 
trade secrets registrar or the court are: Is the registered 
information indeed the former employer’s trade secret? If it is, 
can it prevent the employee’s move to a competitor, and if so, for 
what period of time? 
Reduction in the duration of the litigation necessarily 
reduces the litigation costs, which is one of the goals of the 
proposed trade secret registry.  I noted above that escrow 
companies provide a service to companies that deposit secret 
 
granting of a prohibition of publication with respect to trade secrets that are 
disclosed in a judicial proceeding, in terms of freedom of expression, see State 
ex rel. Sports Mgmt. News, Inc. v. Nachtigal, 921 P.2d 1304 (Or. 1996).  For 
criticism of this decision, see Nicole M. Rhoades, The Constitutional Shaping 
of Oregon’s Trade Secret Law: State ex rel. Sports Management News v. 
Nachtigal, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 629 (1999). 
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information in order to prove that the information was in their 
possession when the former employee worked there.  Such a 
deposit can prevent arguments by the former employee that the 
information was created after he left the company and that the 
information was not known to the company when he worked 
there.  The escrow companies make it possible for companies to 
deposit their secret information without specifying separately 
the scope of the secret information known to each employee.  
When the company does not create an individual deposit, there 
is no solution for two situations: one in which the company 
falsely claims that the employee knew the secrets to which in 
reality he was not exposed; two, a former employee falsely claims 
that he was not exposed to the secrets which were known to the 
company.  The problem can be solved if the company creates an 
individual deposit for each employee, which is currently feasible 
at a reasonable cost as part of the service provided by the escrow 
companies.  The law, however, would have to create legal 
incentives to encourage the companies to update the 
registration, and a legal deterrence to discourage over-
registration.  The proposed trade secret registry can offer the 
same services as the escrow companies, with the additional 
advantages of the mechanism that provides an incentive for 
companies to engage in individual, updated, and accurate 
registration (prevention of over-registration).  Thus, the 
proposed registry narrows the evidentiary gap between the 
parties.  Moreover, the services of the escrow companies do not 
provide a solution for cases in which a new employer does not 
know that the potential employee is bound by a duty of 
confidentiality toward his former employer or his proxies.  The 
proposed trade secret registry enables the deposit of trade 
secrets, similarly to the escrow companies, and also constitutes 
an open registry for the identity of the owners of the secrets and 
of those bound to them by a duty of confidentiality.  As noted 
above, functioning as an open registry for those identities makes 
possible the creation of a source of public information for 
contractual obligations to preserve confidentiality. 
 
D.  Registration of the Transfer of a Trade Secret 
 
The most serious problem faced by an owner who is 
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interested in transferring113 or licensing a trade secret, is the 
Arrow disclosure paradox, which affects negotiations about 
secret information.  According to the paradox, the owner of a 
trade secret will not agree to reveal the secret in negotiations 
unless the potential buyer or licensee commits not to disclose or 
use the secret information in the event that no agreement is 
reached (an NDA).  But, the potential buyer or licensee will 
refuse to sign such a commitment, out of concern that he has 
already developed or can develop the information by self-
discovery or reverse engineering, at a lower cost than the 
requested consideration.  This fact cannot be ascertained before 
the disclosure of the secret in the course of negotiations.  The 
paradox results in the failure of efficient transactions from the 
outset. 
I already noted that private escrow companies offer a 
solution to the paradox by enabling a company (or individual) to 
deposit the information to be offered in the negotiations to prove 
before the negotiations that the seller is the owner of the 
information.  Such a deposit can also protect the offeree company 
because the commitment not to use the information to be 
disclosed in the negotiations applies only if the information was 
deposited by the offeror before the negotiations began and was 
not deposited by the offeree company as part of a routine deposit. 
Such evidence is important given the existing exception in 
commitments not to use information disclosed in negotiations, 
which provides that the commitment does not apply to 
information known to the offeree before the beginning of 
negotiations.  The arrangement of the escrow companies, 
however, resolves only some of the problems presented.  For 
example, it does not resolve the problem of a former employee 
offering a third party to acquire from him his former employer’s 
 
113. An argument can be made that given that a sale is the acquisition of 
an asset, i.e., the owner transfers the asset to the buyer in such a manner that 
the asset is removed from its previous owner, it is not possible to sell a trade 
secret because the asset, i.e., the secret information, remains part of the 
knowledge of the seller.  Milgrim is of the opinion, however, that despite this 
problem, case law, which recognizes the transfer of a trade secret, attests to 
the fact that the elasticity of common law meets the challenge of such an 
amorphous transfer. MILGRIM, supra note 36, vol. 1, § 2.02[1], at 2-43. See the 
long list of case law cited there. If a transfer is accompanied by an explicit or 
implicit commitment not to use the trade secret that was sold, the transaction 
is similar to a sale. 
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trade secret by claiming that he owns it. Therefore, companies 
that conduct negotiations with a person representing himself as 
the owner of a trade secret cannot be certain that the trade 
secret is his, even if he deposited it beforehand with an escrow 
company.  A registry that combines the deposit of trade secrets 
that remain secret, registration of the names of the owners of 
rights and of those bound by the same rights, available for public 
perusal, and the creation of rules to be used to adjudicate 
competing rights, resolves this problem, as well as others 
described below. 
As part of the proposed arrangement, if an inventor wishes 
to transfer secret information to a company he must register the 
information in the registry before the start of negotiations.  If 
the negotiations are unsuccessful and it transpires that the 
company began using the secret information, and that it had not 
registered similar information before the negotiations, the 
inventor has an evidentiary presumption that the company 
received the secret from him.  This is not an irrefutable 
presumption because self-discovery according to the law grants 
the company the right to its own trade secret.  But in the absence 
of registration on its part, and the existence of registration by 
the inventor before the negotiations, it can be assumed that the 
latter disclosed the information in the unsuccessful negotiations 
and the company received the information and used it illegally.  
This presumption can be refuted if the company proves that the 
information was in its possession before to the negotiations.  In 
such a case, the company would be entitled to the same right as 
the one with whom it entered into negotiations.114  Encouraging 
the registration of information that was developed or discovered 
also helps narrow the evidentiary gap and lower the transaction 
costs.  Moreover, the owner of the secret can disclose the 
 
114. This arrangement is also consistent with the existing law, according 
to which in certain cases the obligation to preserve the secrecy of information 
disclosed in negotiations can apply to the offeree, even in the absence of such 
a commitment on its part.  For example, this obligation applies if the offeree 
was warned in advance that the owner of the secret expects it to be kept secret, 
and the offeree failed to refuse to receive it.  It is true that if the information 
was in the possession of the offeree before the negotiations, he is entitled to 
continue to use it based on substantive law, but the burden of proof of this 
claim is on him.  For an analysis of various cases and the law applicable to 
them.  See supra notes 20-21. 
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information as part of the negotiations, with greater, if not 
complete, assurance, even without a prior contractual duty to 
maintain confidentiality. 
If a voluntary sale is at issue, it is possible to include in the 
transfer agreement a prohibition preventing the former owner 
of the secret from using the trade secret herself, reselling it to 
another, or disclosing it to the public.  Even if there is no explicit 
contractual duty, some are of the opinion that this is an implicit 
duty.  In the absence of this restriction, the seller can easily 
cause a decrease in the value of the secret that she has already 
transferred.115 
According to the law to be applied to the trade secret 
registry, the transfer of ownership of an unregistered trade 
secret is void vis-à-vis any buyer, licensee or holder of a 
mortgage who acted in good faith and for consideration, unless 
the transfer was registered in the registry within three months 
of the date of transfer or before the date of purchase, licensing 
or mortgaging.116  Another possible way of resolving the conflict 
between the transfer of an unregistered ownership and a later 
mortgage or license that was registered in good faith and for 
consideration is for the buyer to receive the ownership of the 
trade secret, but subject to the mortgage or license that was 
registered. 
When the owner intends to transfer his trade secret, he 
must also register as the owner of the trade secret with the 
registry, and after the completion of the sales contract, the buyer 
is registered as the “current owner,” and the seller’s registration 
changes from “current owner” to “previous owner.”  The transfer 
of registration transfers the ownership right of the secret to the 
buyer.  Because the registry of transactions conducts no 
 
115. In this regard, see also MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE COMMON LAW OF 
RESTRAINT OF TRADE: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 11-12, 35 (1986). 
Trebilcock notes how courts historically rationalized restriction of occupation 
as the result of the sale of a business more easily than restriction of occupation 
in employee-employer relations. See also PERRITT, supra note 39, at 295-99; 
Bone, supra note 4, at 252 n.56. In the sale of a business, the bargaining power 
is more equal and the profit from the sale enables the seller to engage in some 
other gainful employment.  Bus. Records Corp. v. Lueth, 981 F.2d 957 (7th Cir. 
1992); Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. Danahy, 488 N.E.2d 22, 28 (Mass. App. 
Ct. 1986). 
116. This is similar to the law that applies to the unregistered transfer of 
ownership of patent. See supra note 52. 
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examination before registration regarding the suitability of the 
asset to be registered or the identity of the real owner, the buyer 
is always exposed to the allegation that the seller was not the 
real owner of the trade secret or that the information was not a 
trade secret.  At present, this fact does not prevent the registry 
from recognizing the seller’s ownership as long as the contrary 
has not been proven. 
If the owner has several registered trade secrets, the trade 
secrets registrar must ascertain that the buyer is registered as 
the owner of the registered trade secret that he acquired 
according to the agreement.  Recognizing the transfer of a trade 
secret, or any other transaction involving a secret, only if it is 
carried out through the registry would it bolster the confidence 
in the transactions of trade secrets. The seller’s duty to be 
registered as the owner of the secret in the registry in the first 
place, and retaining his name as the “former owner” even after 
the registration is entered in the name of the buyer, will bring 
about the disclosure of fraudulent transactions in which the 
former owner tries to resell the secret – one of the most deterring 
risks in trade secret transactions.117  According to the procedures 
of the proposed registry, a former owner of a trade secret who 
tries to resell the secret would have to register again as the 
owner of the trade secret.  For every initial registration, the 
registrar of trade secrets would check whether the potential 
registree has not already transferred the trade secret to a third 
party in the past.  If it transpires that the potential registree has 
already transferred the trade secret in the past, the trade secret 
registrar must confirm that the trade secret that the seller 
wants to register is not the secret that was transferred by him 
in the past.  If the trade secret registrar discovers that the 
information is similar, she should not permit the former owner 
to register again as the owner of the secret, and prevent the 
fraudulent transfer before it is completed.118  Constitutive 
registration of transactions concerning the right to the secret, 
and preserving the identity of past owners in the registry, assists 
 
117. MILGRIM, supra note 36, at 2-43. See also supra note 37 and 
accompanying text. 
118. The trade secret registrar generally does not permit a person to 
register his secret a second time (or to register a secret that he already sold to 
someone else) even independently of any attempt to sell the secret. 
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in achieving this goal. 
An attempt to transfer the secret to somebody else by being 
employed by the transferee and represent oneself as the owner 
of the secret is doomed to fail.  As noted, as part of the sale 
transaction, the seller has the duty not to disclose the secret 
after the sale.  At the time of hiring, the new employer must 
examine the registry to verify that the new employee has not 
sold trade secrets in the past.  Such an examination would reveal 
that the employee has already sold the trade secret.  In such a 
case, the new employer would act in the same way as the 
employer who discovers that the potential new employee is 
subject to a duty of confidentiality toward his former employer, 
as described in Section C, supra.  If the new employer does not 
examine the registry, he is considered to be someone who should 
have known that he is receiving a stolen trade secret and is 
therefore committing a tort of trade secret misappropriation. 
The duty to register as the owner of the secret is also 
intended to prevent another type of fraud.  For example, a 
former employee could offer to sell a trade secret of his former 
employer to a competitor without disclosing the source of the 
secret.  Because the employee needs to be registered as the 
owner of the trade secret, the trade secret registrar must check 
whether the potential registree is subject to a duty of 
confidentiality toward a third party.  If the trade secret registrar 
discovers the former employee’s registration, he must check 
whether the secret, which the former employee seeks to register 
as an owner, is different from the secret already registered to the 
former employee.  If it transpires that it is a similar secret, the 
trade secret registrar should not permit the registration of the 
employee as the owner, thereby preventing the transaction 
before it is carried out.  At the same time, the good faith of the 
competitor is also refuted. 
In Part VI, I examined the Indonesian law, which is the only 
official arrangement, to the best of my knowledge, that deals 
with the registration of the identity of transferees and licensees, 
and of their rights to trade secrets.  This law creates a unique 
arrangement, according to which the transfer or licensing of a 
trade secret must be in writing, and must be registered with the 
Office of the Directorate General of Intellectual Property in the 
Indonesian Ministry of Justice.  After the deposit, a notice 
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announcing the transfer or licensing is published in the special 
trade secrets gazette.  The transfer or licensing of a trade secret 
that was not registered with the intellectual property office has 
no validity vis-à-vis third parties.  But as noted, this 
arrangement offers only a partial solution.  If, by perusal of the 
gazette, C knows that in the past A sold a trade secret to B, and 
now A offers C to buy the trade secret, claiming that this is a 
different trade secret, C cannot know that A is deceiving him 
and that he is trying to sell a secret that he has already sold to 
B (clearly, C has no right to see the secret that was sold to B).  
The problem with the Indonesian law is that trade secrets for 
which transactions were carried out that were not deposited 
with an objective entity can compare between trade secrets 
involved in past transactions and those offered in new 
transactions by parties to the earlier transactions.  The trade 
secret registry proposed here requires the deposit of trade 
secrets for which transactions are carried out, and not only the 
transfer or licensing agreements, as required in Indonesia.  
According to the present proposal, the trade secrets registrar has 
the judicial power to act as the objective entity that would 
examine whether fraudulent transactions are being conducted. 
Reduction of the risks in carrying out trade secret 
transactions and an increase in certainty of lower transaction 
costs are objectives of the proposed trade secret registry.  But 
such examinations do not resolve situations in which the former 
owner, who has already sold her secret, or an employee who 
undertook a commitment to keep the information confidential, 
approaches someone else who registers in their place in order to 
sell the secret.  This loophole is not a negligible one, and it 
appears to jeopardize the many advantages of the registry.   The 
response to this loophole must be considered in view of the 
current situation.  In light of existing law, it is easy to carry out 
fraudulent transactions at present, without need to include 
additional entities.  Inclusion of another entity places the 
fraudulent activity at a high risk.  Moreover, the need for 
another person to register with the registry and to disclose his 
identity, so that if the plot is discovered after the fact he bears 
liability for the damage, can deter him from participating in it.119   
 
119. Regulation of the asset through the registry makes it more difficult 
to take the asset from its owner without his consent. Baird & Jackson, supra 
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In any case, if nevertheless a person fraudulently registers 
as the owner and sells the secret to a purchaser, when it later 
becomes clear that the person who registered as the owner of the 
trade secret was not its real owner, the one who purchased from 
her in good faith and for consideration will be liable vis-à-vis the 
true owner, but the circumstances of the purchase will grant 
discretion to the court to exempt the buyer in good faith and for 
consideration from remedies in various amounts.120  This 
arrangement, however, does not appear to solve the problem 
when the potential buyer cooperates with the former seller or 
former employee who proposes to sell him the trade secret 
surreptitiously.  In my opinion, many companies are not 
interested in knowingly taking part in the misappropriation of a 
trade secret.  If the scheme is revealed, they will be liable for 
damages to the owner of the trade secret and their reputation is 
seriously damaged.  As noted, companies fear confrontations 
with owners of trade secrets who offer their secret for sale in 
negotiations to such an extent that they do not even engage in 
such negotiations or require the owner of the secret to sign a 
waiver of his rights, except for his rights pursuant to copyright 
or patent laws, or they consent to purchase the secret at a very 
low price, which does not make economic sense for the owner of 
the secret.121  It appears, therefore, that in most cases the 
companies to whom such a scheme is offered would refuse to 
cooperate with those who misrepresent themselves as owners of 
a trade secret and offer to sell it surreptitiously. 
 
E.  Registration of a License for a Trade Secret 
 
A licensing transaction is an accepted transaction in trade 
secret law.122  The owner of the secret can grant an exclusive or 
 
note 74, at 300, 305, 310. 
120. See supra note 12. Regarding the English and the Australian laws, 
see also supra note 39. 
121. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text. 
122. A known example of a license for a trade secret is the case involving 
the decision in Warner-Lambert Pharm. Co. v. John J. Reynolds, Inc., 178 F. 
Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff’d, 280 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1960).  In this case, a 
license was granted in 1880 for a trade secret, the formula for a disinfectant 
liquid called “Listerine,” and the agreement was that the licensee and his heirs 
would pay royalties to the licensor and his heirs.  Id. at 658.  Royalties were 
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a non-exclusive license for the use of the trade secret.123  The 
question arises whether it is appropriate to grant standing to 
sue a third party only to someone who holds an exclusive license 
or also to a non-exclusive license holder.  In accordance with US 
law, an exclusive licensee can sue for infringement of the trade 
secret for which he holds the license, but afterwards he must 
include the licensor in the action.124  In Germany, the owner of 
the trade secret and the exclusive licensee can sue for breach 
without joining one another, but neither of them has the 
obligation to sue, unless it is required by the licensing 
agreement.  In Belgium, the right to sue for breach is exclusively 
that of the licensor, and he has a duty to initiate such 
proceedings.125  Thus, we should make the right to sue a third 
party that of the owner of the trade secret and of the exclusive 
licensee who is registered as such. 
 In accordance with the policies of the registry, every license 
for a trade secret, whether it is exclusive or not, must be 
registered in order for the licensee’s right to be valid with respect 
to third parties and for him to have the right to sue a third party. 
A license for a trade secret that has not been registered would 
be void vis-à-vis a buyer or mortgagee who registered in good 
faith and for consideration, unless the license was registered 
with the registry within three months from the date of its being 
 
paid for decades, until in 1956, the court was asked to order the cessation of 
the royalty payments for the formula, which had already been published in a 
journal in 1931.  Id. at 667. The court determined that although the secret had 
been disclosed, the royalties must continue to be paid because there was no 
provision in the contract for the cessation of royalty payments.  Id. at 668.  
There were even those who asserted that based on this decision, trade secret 
law is preferable to patent law. A license for a patent would have expired at 
the end of the patent period.  R.M. Halligan, Trade Secret Licensing: The 
‘Listerine’ Formula Case (1998), 
http://tradesecretshomepage.com/license.html.  It seems, however, that it 
would have been appropriate to interpret the contract as ending when the 
trade secret expired. 
123. When granting an exclusive license in which the licenser and the 
licensee are actual or potential competitors, in the US it is necessary to take 
into consideration the Justice Department Guidelines on License Restriction, 
available at www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm, one of the aims of 
which is to prevent restriction of trade. See, PERRITT, supra note 39, at 160-65. 
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granted or before the date of the acquisition or mortgage.126  This 
rule can be expanded so that a license that was not registered 
would also not be valid against a later license that was 
registered in good faith and for consideration.127 
In the context of the registry, the name of the licensee is 
registered next to the name of the owner of the secret.  In cases 
in which the owner of the secret has several registered trade 
secrets, the trade secrets registrar must ensure that the licensee 
is registered only with respect to the registered trade secret for 
which the licensing agreement was reached.  To protect the 
owner of the secret, it is possible to require the licensee to 
register his employees who are bound to maintain 
confidentiality with respect to the trade secrets to which they 
are privy as a result of the license, in a manner similar to the 
arrangement discussed in Section B, supra.128 
In the previous parts, I discussed the existing risks for the 
 
126. This is similar to the law applying to the unregistered transfer of 
ownership of a patent.  See supra note 52. Admittedly, pursuant to the patent 
law, the rule of purchase in good faith and for consideration does not apply to 
a licensee who did not register, but only to a transfer of ownership that was 
not registered. As a result, a later purchaser in good faith is subject to the 
earlier license to the patent that was not registered. This distinction stems 
from the wording of section 261, not from any substantive rationale. See In re 
Cybernetic Servs., Inc., 252 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2001); Moraine Prods. v. 
ICI Am. Inc., 538 F.2d 134, 143 (7th Cir. 1976); Sanofi v. Med-Tech 
Veterinarian Prods., Inc., 565 F. Supp. 931, 939 (D.N.J. 1983); David J. 
Dykeman & Daniel W. Kopko, Recording Patent License Agreements in the 
USPTO, INTELL. PROP. TODAY 18-19 (Aug. 2004); Einhorn, supra note 51, at 2.  
Moreover, the existing distinction in patent law grants the licensee who did 
not register a stronger right than to a buyer who did not register. Because there 
is no substantive rationale for this circumstance, in the proposed trade secrets 
registry the rule of purchase in good faith and for consideration also applies to 
the licensee who did not register. 
127. Admittedly, it has been noted with respect to a license for a patent 
that if there are clashing licenses, the first license would have priority over the 
second license even if the second licensee was not aware of the first license. 
Dykeman & Kopko, supra note 126. But I am of the opinion that because this 
distinction stemmed from the wording of section 261, and because there is no 
rationale for it, in the case of the proposed trade secrets registry priority should 
be given to the later licensee who registered in good faith and for consideration 
over the earlier licensee who did not register. 
128. Regarding the importance of the arrangements in the licensing 
agreement, which require the licensee to ensure that his employees undertake 
to maintain secrecy, see DONALD S. CHISUM & MICHAEL A. JACOBS, 
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owner of the secret and for the licensee in the transaction. An 
exclusive licensee assumes the risk that the owner of the secret 
will continue to grant licenses, in violation of his commitment.129 
The proposed trade secret registry can solve this problem. The 
owner of the secret cannot register an additional license for a 
trade secret for which an exclusive license has already been 
registered, nor can he be registered again as the owner of that 
trade secret to be able to grant an additional license, as stated 
in Section A, supra.  If the second licensee is not registered, he 
takes the risk that the license will not be valid vis-à-vis third 
parties, as stated above.  A further risk exists for the owner of 
the secret, if the licensee represents himself before a third party 
as the owner of the trade secret, trying to sell the secret to a 
third party.130  As with every transaction in a trade secret, the 
licensee must first register as the owner of the trade secret.  The 
registrar of trade secrets examines whether the potential 
registrant is registered as the licensee of a registered trade 
secret.  To reveal the registration of the licensee, the trade 
secrets registrar must examine whether the trade secret for 
which the licensee wishes to register as the owner of the trade 
secret is different from the registered trade secret for which he 
already received a license.  If it turns out that the secret 
information is similar, the trade secrets registrar would not 
permit the licensee to be registered as the owner and thereby 
prevents a deceptive transaction before it comes to fruition.  An 
attempt to transfer the secret to somebody else by being 
employed by the transferee and represent oneself as the owner 
of the secret is doomed to fail.  As part of the licensing 
transaction, there is usually an obligation on the part of the 
licensee not to disclose the secret.  At the time of hiring, the new 
employer would have to check the registry to determine whether 
the new employee is registered as a licensee of a trade secret. 
Such an examination would reveal that the employee is indeed 
registered as a licensee.  In this case, the new employer can act 
in a similar manner as in the case in which it transpires that the 
potential new employee is bound by confidentiality toward his 
former employer.  As stated in Section C, supra, if the new 
employer does not examine the registry, he will be considered to 
 
129. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
130. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
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be someone who should have known that he is receiving a stolen 
trade secret, and therefore, he is committing the tort of trade 
secret misappropriation.  If the license is registered, the licensee 
would not be able to sell the trade secret through the registry, as 
noted above.  In the case of more sophisticated fraud, in which 
the licensee transfers the secret to someone else to be registered 
in his stead, when it later transpires that the one who is 
registered as the owner of the trade secret was not the true 
owner, the purchaser in good faith and for consideration would 
be liable to the true owner, but the circumstances of the 
purchase grant discretion to the court to exempt the purchaser 
in good faith and for consideration from remedies in various 
amounts.131  A similar rule can also be created for cases in which 
a person is registered as the owner of the trade secret, despite 
the fact that he is not the true owner and he grants another 
person a license to the secret. In this case, the licensee in good 
faith and for consideration is liable to the true owner, but the 
circumstances of receipt of the license grant discretion to the 
court to exempt the licensee in good faith and for consideration 
from remedies in various amounts.132 
 
131. See supra note 12. With respect to English and Australian laws, see 
also supra note 39. 
132. With respect to receiving a license to a patent, in Heidelberg Harris, 
Inc. v. Loebach, 145 F. 3d 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998), the court applied the rule of 
the buyer in good faith and for consideration to a licensee of a patent who 
received an exclusive license without knowing that the licensor acquired his 
interest in the patent fraudulently. But in Rhone-Paulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb 
Genetics Corp., 284 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2002), the court took the position that 
because of the special circumstances of the Heidelberg case, as well as the fact 
that the parties were not in disagreement on the subject, Heidelberg is not 
binding regarding the question whether the rule of a buyer in good faith and 
for consideration applies to patent licenses.  Id. at 1334.  In Rhone-Paulenc 
Agro, the court examined the Heidelberg case and stressed that the protection 
of the purchaser in good faith applies only to a transfer, whereas a non-
exclusive license is not a transfer.  Id. at 1330-31.  But under special 
circumstances, an exclusive licensee who has all the substantive rights of the 
owner of the patent can be considered tantamount to a buyer.  Id. at 1334.  In 
the case at hand, the rights did not include all the substantive rights, and 
therefore the protection for a buyer in good faith and for consideration did not 
apply.  Id. The significance of the decision is that only an exclusive licensee, 
who has all the substantive rights, can benefit from the protection for a buyer 
in good faith and for consideration. Other approaches support the viewpoint 
that the rule of the buyer in good faith and for consideration does not apply to 
a license for a patent. Even with respect to subjects that are not related to 
patent licenses, the case law has determined that the rule of the buyer in good 
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As noted, the Indonesian law requires the registration of 
licensing agreements with respect to trade secrets with the 
Office of the Directorate General of Intellectual Property in the 
Indonesian Ministry of Justice. After the deposit, a notice is 
published regarding the transfer or the license in a special 
gazette of trade secrets. The transfer or licensing of a trade 
secret that is not documented with the Intellectual Property 
Office is not valid with respect to third parties. But as noted, this 
arrangement provides only a partial solution. Even if C knows 
that A gave an exclusive license to B to use the trade secret, and 
now A is offering C to acquire a license to use the trade secret, 
claiming that it is a different trade secret, C cannot know that A 
is deceiving him and is trying to give him a license for the same 
trade secret to which B has already received an exclusive license. 
Another problem occurs if C knows that B received a license for 
a trade secret from A in the past, and now B proposes that C 
purchase the trade secret, claiming that this is a different trade 
secret. C cannot know that B is deceitful and that he is trying to 
sell him a trade secret to which B holds only a license for use. 
The difficulty with the Indonesian law is that the trade secrets 
involved in transactions were not deposited with an objective 
entity that could compare the trade secrets involved in 
transactions in the past with the trade secrets offered in new 
transactions by those who had been parties to the earlier 
transactions. The trade secret registry that we propose requires 
the deposit of the trade secrets that have been licensed, and 
grants objective judicial authority to the trade secrets registrar 
to make sure that another license has not been given for a trade 
secret for which an exclusive license has already been granted, 






faith and for consideration applies only to someone who acquired legal rights. 
See Dykeman & Kopko, supra note 126. But I am of the opinion that within the 
framework of the proposed trade secrets registry, the licensee of a trade secret 
should be protected in case of erroneous registration of the owner of the secret, 
so that he is liable to the real owner, but the circumstances of receiving the 
license should grant discretion to the court to exempt the licensee who acted in 
good faith and for consideration from remedies in various amounts. 
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F.  Registration of Collateral for a Trade Secret 
 
The main asset of startup companies is their secret 
information.  At times, they have so much faith in the potential 
of their initiative that they would prefer to take a loan for initial 
financing and mortgage their trade secret, rather than sell 
percentages of ownership, as they are forced to do at present.133 
The information era requires coordination between intellectual 
property laws in general, and specifically between trade secrets 
law and commercial financing law.  This coordination is 
essential during the stage of product development, when, in the 
absence of a reasonable level of investment and financial 
support, the ability to develop new information is lost.  The 
mortgaging of information is especially vital for companies 
whose main asset is the secret information they own.  It may be 
assumed that an increase in the number of companies of this 
nature will increase the need for the mortgaging of trade secrets. 
It is therefore desirable to address the question of whether it is 
possible and appropriate to mortgage a trade secret, and if yes, 
what is the proper manner of doing it.  To make the mortgaging 
of information assets attractive, it is necessary to create a clear 
law that reduces the risk a financier takes upon himself when 
granting a loan in exchange for the mortgage of an intangible 
asset, such that the cost of the mortgage is reduced.134 
 The mortgaging of a trade secret raises several difficulties 
in the various stages of the transaction. (a) As noted, 
professional financiers generally refuse to sign an advance 
commitment to preserve confidentiality. This phenomenon is 
similar to the Arrow disclosure paradox that manifests itself 
during negotiations about the secret information. (b) In the 
absence of proof of what the mortgaged trade secret is, the 
professional financier is concerned that if the loan is not repaid 
he will not be able to prove what constituted the content of the 
mortgaged trade secret. (c) An additional risk is that the 
founders and employees of the company may state that the trade 
 
133. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. 
134. See Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 48, at 195-200, 226. On the 
importance of the ability to encumber trade secrets, see also Lars S. Smith, 
Trade Secrets in Commercial Transactions and Bankruptcy, 40 IDEA: THE J. 
L. & TECH. 549 (2000). 
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secrets in their possession were developed only after they had 
left the company, and therefore the collateral is not applicable 
to them. (d) In most cases, a financier who has decided to invest 
in a startup company (after having been persuaded of the 
potential of the secret information in her possession, and of its 
suitability to serve as collateral) will be interested in having the 
collateral include the future development of the secret 
information as well, because its value will be greater than the 
initial secret information presently in the company’s possession, 
at the initial stages of development. Hence, the need arises for 
an efficient system, with sensible rules that can follow the 
development of the secret information over time, so that the 
mortgage applies to the development of the new information as 
well, without creating a complicated mechanism that would 
increase the transaction costs. (e) An additional problem 
concerns the ability to separate and distinguish between the 
owner’s various trade secrets if he wishes to mortgage only one 
of them.  If the mortgage agreement between the owner of the 
secret and the financier includes only general definitions, it will 
be difficult to distinguish later between the various secrets that 
exist in similar business areas.  A clear separation between the 
assets that are mortgaged and those that are not mortgaged is 
also important in the case of bankruptcy. (f) The value of the 
collateral is determined according to several parameters: (i) the 
existence of the mortgaged asset, proof of the mortgagor’s 
ownership of the mortgaged asset, and the absence of a breach 
of the rights of third parties; (ii) the ability of the owner of the 
asset to protect his property; (iii) the ability of the owner of the 
collateral to exercise of the mortgage.  The proof of these 
parameters is not simple. For example, the owner of the 
collateral must ensure that it is possible to sell the trade secret 
at the time it is realized without impairing its confidentiality, 
and that it is possible to promise to the potential purchaser that 
the debtor will not use the secret information or transfer it to 
another party after the sale. (g) It must be practically possible 
to ensure the rights of the owner of the collateral vis-à-vis third 
parties.  To make possible the mortgaging of trade secrets, it is 
also necessary to create a system that would allow the 
registration of the mortgages so that third parties can be 
warned, and thus to grant the financier the standing of a secured 
creditor. The standard registration systems of mortgages are not 
68http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/1
  
2014 TRADE SECRETS REGISTRY 523 
appropriate for the mortgaging of trade secrets that cannot, for 
example, be listed in a registry open to the public. Because of the 
many difficulties in the mortgaging of a trade secret, there are 
few instances in which companies mortgage them despite the 
advantages inherent in doing so, as noted above.135 
In the U.S., the importance of the enabling mortgaging of a 
trade secret has been recognized for some time, and therefore 
the literature has attempted to address some of these problems. 
Trade secrets may be mortgaged pursuant to Article 9 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C).  To mortgage a trade secret, 
it is necessary, among others, to sign an agreement and to 
register a financing statement.  Neither of these requires 
providing details of the trade secret; it is sufficient to define it as 
“general intangibles” or “trade secrets.”136  Two possibilities have 
been proposed for maintaining confidentiality during 
negotiations for the sale of the trade secret by the financier in 
the event of realization of the collateral.  One is requiring the 
potential buyer to sign a confidentiality agreement, the other is 
the blind acquisition of the secret.137  Regarding the ability to 
sell the secret at the time of realization, the literature insists 
that the former owner of the secret and the financier are bound 
 
135. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text. Regarding questions 
and issues raised here, see also Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 48, at 200-
201, 204, 224-26; IP Audit Trail Services, supra note 14; IP Collateral and 
Investment Protection Service, supra note 55. Clearly, it is not possible to create 
a pawned mortgage in a trade secret, which requires that the asset leave the 
possession of the debtor.  Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 48, at 209; 
PERRITT, supra note 39, at 303. 
136. See In re Dillard Ford, Inc., 940 F.2d 1507, 1512 (11th Cir. 1991); In 
re Boogie Enters., 866 F.2d. 1172 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Antenna 
Sys. Inc., 251 F. Supp. 1013, 1016 (D.N.H. 1966); PERRITT, supra note 39, at 
302-309; Bramson, supra note 50, at 1578, 1589; Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra 
note 48, at 209; see also In re James Cable Partners, 141 B.R. 772, 774 (Bankr. 
M.D. Ga. 1992) (quoting an agreement relating to a trade secret as being 
covered as a type of general intangible entity); In re John Oliver Co., 91 B.R. 
643, 644 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1988) (quoting an agreement that explicitly referred 
to a trade secret). 
137. It is stated, for example, that a buyer wishing to purchase the 
formula of Coca Cola is interested in doing so not because he saw the formula 
and was convinced of its potential but because he is aware of the marketing 
appeal of the drink based on the formula, and therefore it may be assumed that 
the buyer will agree to purchase the formula even without seeing it before the 
purchase. For this example and another one concerning a list of clients, see 
PERRITT, supra note 39, at 310-11. 
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by an explicit or implicit contractual duty not to use the secret 
or to disclose it, although there are fewer enforcement and 
deterrent measures with respect to the former owner of the 
secret than with respect to the financier.138 
Because the literature has made note of the vital need to 
include in the framework of the mortgaging of information 
assets the information developed after the creation of the 
mortgage, some suggested classifying the new developments as 
proceeds, making them subject to the rules provided in the 
U.C.C., which regulate the applicability of collateral rights to 
proceeds. This rule follows the proceeds received from the 
original product and provides that a collateral right in the 
original product is also valid as against the products that will be 
derived from it in the future, but at the present it does not 
include new research and development. The opinion has been 
expressed in the literature that this rule can be expanded to 
include new developments in the field of intellectual property.139 
It may be possible to solve this issue by considering the 
mortgaging of the new developments as a mortgage of a future 
asset.140  But the solutions proposed in the literature present 
several difficulties.  The definition of the trade secret in the 
mortgage agreement and in the registration framework as 
“general intangibles” or as a “trade secret” and nothing more, 
ignores the fact that often the financier is interested in the 
existence of the content of the secret beyond its simple definition, 
in order to prevent a situation in which, beyond the general 
definition there is no formula as promised.  Moreover, the 
financier will want the possibility of proving specifically what 
the secret is, if at the time of realization of the mortgage, there 
is an argument about the content of the trade secret that was 
mortgaged.  Similarly, a general definition of “trade secret” will 
make the mortgaging of a specific trade secret from among all of 
 
138. The former owner of the secret, who is disappointed with the failure 
of his business, is more likely to breach his obligation.  Id. at 311-14. 
139. Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 48, at 224, 226 (citing In re 
Transp. Design & Tech., Inc., 48 B.R. 635, 641 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1985)).  A rule 
requiring a commercial entity to re-register rights to new information, which 
was developed with existing technology and which is subject to an existing 
security agreement, will cause unnecessary costs without bringing any obvious 
benefits.  Id. at 227. 
140. See U.C.C. §§ 9-203, 9-204(a), 9-502(d) (1977). 
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the borrower’s trade secrets problematic. 
The proposed trade secret registry can assist with the 
difficulties discussed above.  As part of the negotiations for 
receiving a loan, the owner of the secret can disclose the secret 
to the financier with greater confidence if he has registered the 
secret with the proposed registry before the negotiations, similar 
to registering the secret before negotiations for its sale, as 
discussed in Section D, supra.  In this manner, the negotiations 
can go forward even if the financier refuses to sign a 
confidentiality agreement in advance.  After the consent to 
finance is given, it is possible to prepare a mortgage agreement 
that includes the lender’s commitment to maintain 
confidentiality.  An additional problem arises because of the 
lender’s desire to have proof of the content of the trade secret in 
order to forestall argument at the time of realization of the 
mortgage.  Because the owner of the secret often does not trust 
the lender’s ability to maintain the confidentiality of the 
information and to take appropriate security measures, and the 
lender, on his part, is not willing to transact the mortgage 
without proof of the nature of the mortgaged trade secret, a 
difficulty arises that the registry can help solve. 
The parties can register the trade secret in the registry in 
such a way that the borrower is registered as the owner and the 
lender as the owner of the mortgaged information.  The 
registered trade secret cannot be erased by its owner.  This type 
of mortgage is appropriate for trade secrets that, by nature, are 
not supposed to change and develop, such as chemical formulas, 
but it is not appropriate for a trade secret that is continually 
developing.  Most trade secrets, however, are not frozen and 
continue to be developed.  As noted, the lender is usually 
prepared to accept the trade secret as collateral, on condition 
that the security applies to the continued developments.  This 
subject has raised a great deal of difficulty in the literature. 
Indeed, it requires a system of sensible rules that can follow the 
developing asset and apply the collateral to it.  It needs to enable 
the financier to prove, at the time of realization, what the 
updated trade secret is, and to make it possible to distinguish 
between various trade secrets of the owner of the secret when he 
mortgages only some of them.   
The proposed trade secret registry provides a solution to 
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these problems. In the previous part, I noted that the employer 
has several incentives to register his trade secrets with the 
registry so that his employees become registered as subject to 
the trade secrets exposed to them or developed by them in the 
course of their work. Employers who do not carry out this 
registration and do not update the registration of the developing 
trade secrets will not be able to request an ex ante order 
restraining occupation, and will take the risk that their 
employees will be able to sell their trade secrets to third parties 
(as discussed below). The mortgage of the company’s trade 
secrets registered with the registry for the purpose of identifying 
those who are subject to them makes possible dynamic 
mortgaging of the trade secrets developed over time and 
cyclically updated. But because at issue is a trade secret for 
which the company is supposed to update registration on a daily 
basis, there is concern that instead of updating the registration 
as development continues, the company will empty the mortgage 
of all significance by erasing it when the moment of truth comes.  
To address this problem, the following arrangements are 
proposed. If a company mortgages its trade secrets, which are 
updated daily in the registry with respect to its employees, the 
updates do not replace any previous updates but are appended 
to the previous updates, which are saved with a date stamp, 
indicating the date on which they were recorded.  The owner of 
the mortgage can inspect the updated secret information at all 
times.  This arrangement ensures that even if the company finds 
that at some point it may not be able to make payments on the 
loan, and therefore stops updating the registry, the financier can 
exercise the mortgage based on the near-latest version of the 
trade secret.  The financier’s right to view the registration allows 
him to ascertain that updates are being carried out while the 
mortgage is in effect.  A failure to update the registry will enable 
the financier to exercise the mortgage based on the most recent 
update registered.  Because the financier agreed to give the loan 
on the basis of the original version of the secret, he will not incur 
great damage by the failure to adhere to the planned updating, 
and will redeem the mortgage based on the original trade secret 
or on the latest update that was registered. 
The right to see the mortgaged trade secret which is 
registered, together with the sanction of realization of the 
72http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/1
  
2014 TRADE SECRETS REGISTRY 527 
mortgage in the absence of periodic updating, enables the 
creation of a dynamic mortgage in cases in which the original 
registration was not intended only to serve public notice of the 
fact that the employees are subject to it, but also in usual cases 
in which the owner of a trade secret wants to mortgage his 
secret.  The sanction of realization of the mortgage in the 
absence of updates provides incentives to the owner of the secret 
to update the registry.  When the update is not tied to the 
relationship of the owner of the secret with his employees, there 
is a risk that the owner of the secret would update the registry 
inaccurately in a way that the financier might not be able to 
discover.  But because the previous versions are saved, the 
financier can exercise the mortgage according to the initial 
version, based on which he agreed to provide the loan.  Saving 
the registration in this manner is more expensive but has 
another practical advantage.  If information is backed up in such 
a way that each update does not erase the previous update, and 
all the updates are saved with the timestamp of registration, 
information that has changed can be recreated if there is a need 
to review the information created in the past or that has changed 
in the course of development. 
To make the mortgage valid vis-à-vis third parties acting in 
good faith, double registration is necessary.  One registration is 
made in the mortgage registry pursuant to Article 9 of the 
U.C.C., where it is registered that the owner mortgaged a trade 
secret to the benefit of the financier, deposited in box X in the 
trade secret registry. The second registration is in the trade 
secret registry, where the owner is registered as the owner of the 
trade secret in box X, and the financier is registered as the owner 
of the mortgage.141  It may be desirable, however, to adopt the 
model of exclusive registration of the mortgage in the trade 
secret registry.  In accordance with the law applicable to the 
trade secret registry, mortgaging of a trade secret at a time when 
it is not registered will be void for any purchaser, mortgagee, or 
licensee who registered in good faith and for consideration, 
unless the mortgage was registered in the registry within three 
months from the date of its creation or before the date of the 
 
141. Double registration is also needed with respect to mortgaging a 
patent.  See generally Einhorn, supra note 51. 
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purchase, mortgage, or license.142  Additionally, a mortgage of a 
trade secret that was registered takes preference over a previous 
buyer, an owner of mortgage, and a licensee who did not register 
their rights.143 
In previous parts, I noted that private escrow companies 
already enable the deposit of trade secrets for the purpose of 
mortgaging them to investors.  As part of this service, the secret 
information cannot be erased, and therefore the lender can rely 
on the secret information as a pledge, without concern that the 
trade secret will disappear.  Dating of the deposit of information 
prevents an allegation on the part of the owners of the company 
or its employees that the secret information in their possession 
was created after they had left the company and that thus the 
mortgage does not apply to them.  Tying the mortgage to the 
secret information deposited in a specific box in the escrow 
company can address the problem of the separation and 
distinction between the trade secrets of the owner of the secret, 
if he wishes to mortgage only one trade secret.  The periodic 
deposit of developing trade secrets with the escrow company as 
security for a loan creates a dynamic mortgage that applies to 
the developing secret.   
But this service has two main problems. To receive priority 
relative to other creditors, the security must be registered in the 
mortgage registry, and there must be an incentive for the 
borrowing companies to update the secret deposited as collateral 
for the loan. The proposed trade secret registry, as a statutory 
body, also serves as a source of referrals for registries of 
mortgages or as the exclusive registry in which the mortgage is 
registered. It also creates incentives for the owner of the secret 
 
142. This is similar to the law applicable to the unregistered transfer of 
ownership of a patent.  See supra note 52. Indeed, with respect to patents, 
section 261 is not applicable to a mortgage that was not registered but rather 
to transfers of ownership that were not registered, see supra note 126, and it is 
also inapplicable to the licensee, see supra note 127. But as stated, this stems 
from the wording of section 261, and there is no reason not to apply the rule to 
this case as well. 
143. It is true that with respect to patents, section 261 applies to anyone 
who receives a mortgage in good faith and for consideration as against a 
previous transfer of ownership that was not registered, and not to a mortgage 
and license that were not registered. But, as stated, this stems from the 
wording of section 261, and there is no rationale for not applying the rule in 
these cases as well. 
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to update the registration, as noted above. 
In cases in which the owner of the secret has several 
registered trade secrets, the trade secrets registrar makes sure 
that the mortgage is registered on the registered trade secret for 
which the mortgage agreement was created. Thus, the register 
enables a buyer, licensee, or secured creditor to ensure that they 
receive rights with respect to a trade secret to which no previous 
rights have been registered, and to know what the trade secret 
is that is the subject of their rights. This solution, however, is 
not satisfactory for regular creditors of the owner of the secret, 
because they will not be able to know whether the main trade 
secrets of the owner of the secret are pledged, or only trade 
secrets that are secondary in importance.144  This appears to 
infringe on the rights of regular creditors, but these creditors do 
not generally rely on the registration of a particular asset as a 
source for collecting their debts because the rights to such asset 
are likely to change in the future. 
The proposed registry can also assist in determining the 
value of the collateral that was established, as noted above, 
based on several parameters: (a) The existence of the mortgaged 
asset, proof of the mortgagor’s ownership of the mortgaged asset, 
and the absence of a breach of the rights of third parties. The 
registry allows the disclosure of the secret to a financier in order 
for him to be assured of its existence, to verify that it is suitable 
for a trade secret, and to estimate its value. The registry 
increases certainty regarding the ownership of the mortgagor 
with respect to the trade secret and decreases the risk of 
violation of rights of third parties, even if it does not absolutely 
prevent such violations.  (b) The ability of the owner of the secret 
 
144. See Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra, note 48, at 226. Apparently, it 
would have been possible to consider requiring that a general description of 
the secret would be provided in the mortgage notice so that the creditor could 
distinguish between the various mortgaged secrets. This option does not 
appear to be desirable at first glance. (a) The fact that someone is engaged in 
a particular activity can be information he may not wish to disclose to the 
public. (b) As there is no external entity to check the accuracy of the description 
at the time of registration (because this is a registry of transactions and not a 
registry of rights), it could be a source for fraud. (c) The initial description of a 
trade secret is not always relevant for the continued development of the secret, 
and we wish to make registration easy and not require the registrant to update 
the description each time the secret is updated. (d) A general description can 
be vague and cause lack of clarity. 
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to protect his property. In the previous parts I described how the 
proposed trade secret registry assists in preventing trade secret 
misappropriation by former employees, former sellers, and 
licensees.145 (c) The ability of the owner of the security to realize 
the pledge: the proposed registry would also assist in the sale of 
the trade secret at the time of realization, pursuant to the rules 
of sale, as noted above. 
In view of the above, the proposed arrangement makes the 
use of a trade secret as collateral for a loan more efficient, and 
thus reduces the financing costs and the interest offered to the 
borrower. 
 
G.  The Liability of the Registry to the Owner of the Secret 
 
As stated in Section B, supra, the concern that companies 
and individuals may be apprehensive about depositing trade 
secrets with the proposed registry is not justified in the present 
reality in which companies deposit secrets with escrow 
companies and backup sites.  Nevertheless, to increase 
confidence in the use of the registry and to reduce the risk by 
spreading the damage in the event that the registry is broken 
into with the intent of stealing the deposited trade secrets, the 
registry can provide the option of an insurance against breaking 
into the registry, the misappropriation of trade secrets, forgery, 
fraud, etc.  It is also possible to establish an insurance fund to 
compensate for damages likely to be incurred as a result of the 
use of the registry, such as compensation for damage caused by 
the trade secret registry.  Such a fund could be financed by the 
registration fees.  Similar systems are in use in various types of 
lands registries.146   Operators of the registry would bear liability 
in such events, among others, for breach of contract and torts of 
negligence.  The liability of an outside party in the event of 
breaking the encryption may be based, among others, on the 
torts of trade secret misappropriation and of unjust enrichment. 
 
 
145. In the previous parts, I discussed the contribution of the registry to 
improving the control of the owner of the secret over his property, which is 
necessary for appraisal of the property and its ability to serve as a security.  
See Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 48, at 195-200, 226. 
146. E. DOWSON & V.L. SHEPPARD, LAND REGISTRATION 79, 124 (1952). 
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H.  An International Trade Secrets Registry 
 
The efficiency of the proposed registry would increase if it 
operated as an international registry. The global village of today 
stems, among other things, from the technological and cultural 
developments that have increased the mobility of information 
and of employees. The mobility of these resources has made 
possible the flourishing of international companies that employ 
workers in many countries.  Another recent phenomenon is the 
increase in the number of international transactions in 
information in general and in secret information in particular. 
This increase reflects the transformation of the commercial 
market, especially the global market of ideas and opinions. 
These phenomena are important components of the 
globalization process.147 
The advantages of the registry as a tool that publicizes the 
identity of the owners of rights to trade secrets and those 
subordinate to them, and as a tool that limits the litigation costs 
and reduces the cost of transactions in rights to trade secrets, 
are even more vital for international companies and for 
transactions that have international elements.  Currently, many 
countries provide protection for rights to trade secrets.148  But 
the laws of trade secrets and those addressing related 
transactions are not the same in the various countries that 
protect these rights.  These differences create an artificial 
barrier that hampers international companies dealing in secret 
information and international transactions in secret 
information.  International commercial activity requires 
international legal arrangements that reduce the uncertainty 
resulting from the lack of uniformity in national laws.  Given the 
efficiency of international arrangements, it makes sense to 
create a unified international registry.  For the registry to 
 
147. Regarding globalization in a context of legal theory, see William 
Twining, Globalisation and Legal Theory: Some Local Implications, 49 
CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 1 (1996). 
148. Bramson, supra note 50, at 1574. For a broad survey of trade secrets 
law in many countries, see COHEN & GUTTERMAN, supra note 8, at 413-16 and 
2000 Supplement, at 59-80; 1 WORLD WIDE TRADE SECRETS LAW (Terrence F. 
MacLaren ed., West Group, Dec., 2002). For a survey of the differences in the 
laws in the states of the United States, see TRADE SECRETS: A STATE-BY-STATE 
SURVEY (Brian M. Malsberger et al., eds., 1997). 
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operate in the international arena, it is necessary to resolve the 
question of choice of law, so that the registry can operate based 
on uniform procedural and substantive laws. An additional 
problem has to deal with the protection of intellectual property, 
which by nature enjoys territorial protection. One of the 
objectives of conventions in the field of intellectual property is to 
make it easier to gain as broad a territorial protection as 
possible.  A detailing of the various types of conventions in this 
field is beyond the scope of the present paper.  There is no doubt, 
however, that the aspiration is to create a unified, international, 
global registry for each type of registered intellectual property, 
both from the procedural point of view (establishing a single 
international registry that would provide protection in every 
country that joins the arrangement and would replace the 
national registries), and from the point of view of substantive 
law, by enacting a uniform law in these countries.149 
Establishing an international trade secret registry will 
encounter fewer difficulties than establishing an international 
registry in other areas of intellectual property, such as patents, 
designs, trademarks and geographic indications.  In these areas 
of intellectual property, a preliminary examination is required 
before registration to determine whether the requirements for 
registration are met and to ascertain the identity of the owner of 
the intellectual property.  The conventions dealing with 
international arrangements must create a mechanism for 
communicating with the national offices for registration or 
serving as a substitute for them.  This problem does not arise for 
the registry for trade secrets.  In the case of the proposed 
registry, there is no need to conduct a preliminary examination 
of the information being registered.  Moreover, the conventions 
concerning other types of intellectual property must overcome 
their territorial nature.  This problem does not arise in the case 
of the protection of trade secrets because the protection is not 
territorial.  A person is not entitled to use a trade secret without 
 
149. For a prediction about the likelihood of such a registry being 
established in the field of patents, see Gerald J. Mossinghoff & Vivian S. Kuo, 
World Patent System Circa 20xx, A.D., 38 IDEA: THE J. L. & TECH. 529, 547 
(1998); see also Amir H. Khoury, The End of the National Patent Office, 52 
IDEA: THE J. L. & TECH. 197 (2012). 
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the consent of its owner, not even in another country.150 
For the trade secret registry to operate as an international 
registry the issue of the uniformity of the law in the various 
countries must be addressed.  In order to create uniformity in 
the law it will be possible to create an international convention 
for the operation of the trade secret registry could achieve the 
required uniformity and establish the rules according to which 
the registry should operate as a sole international registry, 
taking into account the substantive trade secrets law.151  The 
convention would issue a uniform law, including a binding 
version, which each party state would have to enact as its 
national law, so that the laws of the convention would replace 




In the introduction, I noted that most of the researchers who 
have discussed the efficiency of the two main systems of 
protection of inventions, patents and trade secrets, have arrived 
 
150. For the problems created at the interface between the registry and 
the territorial jurisdiction regarding real property and chattels, see also Baird 
& Jackson, supra note 74, at 310-11. The authors also address registries for 
patents, copyright, and trademarks, but not their international aspects. 
151. Where there is no uniformity in the law regarding the various 
transactions, many difficulties can arise. For example, Bramson recommends 
that someone accepting a security that is a trade secret should check whether 
there are foreign rights involved, and if such rights exist, to examine the law 
in the foreign countries conferring such rights and the rules according to which 
it is necessary to act in order to complete a security interest with respect to 
such rights. See Bramson, supra note 50, at 1573. 
152. This is the method that was used in the Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods, April 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3. The law that 
was enacted following the convention has already been adopted by many 
countries; therefore it achieves the objective of creating a uniform 
international law with respect to the determination of the rights and 
obligations of sellers and buyers in international sales transactions. Another 
example of a convention that established international registries of rights with 
respect to assets, including the substantive laws that apply to such rights, is 
the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, Nov. 16, 2001, 
2307 U.N.T.S. 285, which established international registries for the rights 
and transactions related to aircraft, trains, and space equipment. But no 
international registries for trains and space equipment have been established 
yet because the relevant protocols have not yet been ratified by the required 
number of states. 
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at the conclusion that these are complementary systems, i.e., in 
some cases the inventor should choose the patent system and in 
other cases the trade secrets method.  In most cases, the choice 
depends on the nature of the invention and the circumstances of 
the case.153  In the first four parts I showed that patents are 
preferable to trade secrets in four main aspects: patents lower 
litigation costs, transaction costs, financing costs, and 
employment costs.  As part of the analysis of the proposed trade 
secret registry, I demonstrated how it would reduce litigation 
costs in cases of trade secret misappropriation by a former 
employee.  I also showed how the proposed registry reduces the 
costs of transactions involving trade secrets (sale, licensing, and 
collaterals).  The registry would dramatically improve the 
marketability of trade secrets and reduce the risk associated 
with market transactions.  According to Professor Robert 
Merges, “in the presence of high transaction costs, industry 
participants have an incentive to invest in institutions that 
lower the costs of IPR exchange.”154  The proposed trade secret 
registry achieves this objective. 
Financing costs would also be lower as the registry would 
make it possible to use the trade secret as collateral for a loan. 
The proposed registry would also make the misappropriation of 
trade secrets by former employees more difficult, and in this way 
it can reduce employment costs and prevent the unlawful 
mobility of information.  These advantages are consistent with 
one of the most important rationales for the existence of a right 
to trade secrets: promoting business ethics and fair 
competition.155 
 
153. See supra note 4 and the accompanying text. 
154. Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual 
Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2655 (1994). 
155. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
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